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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis of this paper is neither new, nor subtle. It has, in fact, been a 
recurrent theme in many writings concerned with the interests in copyright1 and 
their effects in the present world. 
When I first started to- think about this paper I imagined an incendiary 
introduction: "Whereas the author's interests were originally the focus of both 
the Copyright2 and the Authorship systems3, this is no longer true. Both 
systems promote other~ quite different, even opposite, interests." I abandoned 
this introductory passage discovering that the author's interests have never been 
1
• I use the term "copyright" in its broadest sense, or in other words, to designate the legal 
protection of non-functional ideas expressed in a tangible form. Here, it is virtually synonymous 
with "literary and artistic property". 
2
. In this case I use Copyright" as a generic term for any kind of literary property protection 
in countries of common law origin (by common law or statute), as opposed to the protection 
conferred by the civil law system. For an overview of the differences between these two major 
legal systems, see A. T. von Mahren, and J. R. Gordley, "The Civil Law System. An 
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law" Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1957; A. T. von 
Mehren, "Law in the United States", Kluver, Boston, 1989. 
3
• I use the expression "Authorship protection", as synonymous with "author's rights 
system", and as a generic appellation of literary property protection conferred by the civil law 
system, and opposed to that of the common law system. See supra note no. 2. 
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the focus of copyright4 (or at least the real interest of such laws). On the other 
hand, authors have never obtained such great benefit from their intellectual 
productions as today. (Though this is reliably the case only in societies where 
there is a productive industry producing intellectual goods, and a large number 
of consumers of intellectual production5 .) 
Aside from such speculations over the focus of copyright statutes6, my 
concern is also with the perversion of domestic copyright provisions from an 
incentive for learning and progress7--within whatever limits that goal was fairly 
found in statute and case decisions--into an insurmountable international obstacle 
to learning and education. The position taken by GA'IT8 in its TRIPs 
4
• See supra note no. 1. 
5
• About the relationship between the consumers, their degree of literacy, and the real 
possibility of different financial rewards for authors, see M. J. Holland, "A Brief History of 
American Copyright Law", Copyright Dilemma, (ed. H. S. White), American Library 
Association, Chicago, 1978, at 3. 
6
• See note no. l. 
7
• See, i.e. the English and American copyright systems where the ultimate goal is expressly 
stated. 
8
• Within GATT the partners were the winners of a world war (1947). They decided to 
rationalize their international economic interdependencies, at an institutional level. (GATT, 
1947, for some purists, but not for Keneth Dam, was not an International Organization. "The 
GATI. Law and International F.conomic Organization", Chicago UP, Chicago, 1970, at 335.) 
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exemplifies why the use of intellectual works, even if technically free for 
educational purposes9 become in fact unavailable for developing countries10, 
Initially they seemed oblivious of the very existence of their "less-developed partners n. 
This is partly true and understandable because some of the present developing countries were 
covered by colonial "representation". They were either the United Kingdom (Annex A), or the 
United States of America (Annex D), or incorporated in the French Union (Annex B), or in the 
Customs Union of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (Annex C). Dam, The GATI, 
448-9. And partly because the remaining part of the current "less-developed" countries, were 
simply not yet members. 
Of the former socialist countries, the former republic of Czechoslovakia "was a 
contracting party before it adopted socialist institutions", and Poland, since 1967, "has 
participated in the work of the GA TI under special and highly limited arrangements." Hungary 
and Romania were accorded "only observer status," and the remaining East European countries 
(Bulgaria, Albania and the former countries included in the Soviet Union), excepting the former 
Yugoslavia, had no relations at all with the GATI. The best position was probably occupied by 
the former Yugoslavia, which was regarded as a possible future partner with a market economy. 
Dam, The GATI, 317. 
9
• The Berne Convention, the Paris Act (1971) ensures free access to foreign educational 
sources under certain conditions. For the text of this amendment, V. Porter, "Beyond the Berne 
·Convention: Copyright, Broadcasting and the Single Market," John Libbey, London, 1991, 101-
8 [hereinafter Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention]. 
About the goal, from a publisher's perspective, of educational achievement in relation 
to the economic level in developing countries, such as India, D. N. Malhorta, "The Publishing 
and Copyright Situation in India," Copyright. Economic and Cultural Challenge, (Publishers' 
International Union 2d Symposium, April 1990) LITEC Paris, 1990, 143-7. 
On the younger component of the population which interests the World Bank as an 
important potential market (more than one out of two children worldwide does not own a 
textbook), B. Salome, "World Bank Activity in Support of Publishing in the Developing 
Countries, " id., at 164. 
About the functions of the UNFSCO's International Copyright Information Center, which 
primarily assists users in the developing countries to secure copyright clearance on favorable 
terms, especially in the case of educational works, J .Phillips, R. Durie, and I. Karet, "Whale 
on Copyright," Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993, at 154 [hereinafter Whale on Copyright]. 
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when practical access to them becomes subject to limited or even monopolized 
technological means, such as data bases. Consequently, Copyright11 and so 
called author's rights12 have become another powerful instrument to control and 
dominate this world of sound and fury. 
This paper is structured in three parts. The first (Book I) addresses the 
original interests of copyright and the insinuated mutual international interactions 
between different national copyright regimes. It attempts to reveal the 
commercial essence of copyright13 generated by its educational (in the non-
ideological sense) and censorial side14• The second part (Book m is focused on 
10
• Among many other tasks, ~CO uses data bases in developing countries to keep 
abreast of domestic copyright developments as well as about international treaties. See, A. 
Garz6n, "UNESCO and Copyright in the Developing Countries", id., 170-3. 
11
• See, supra note no. 2. 
12
• See supra note -no. 3. 
13
• See supra note no. 1 
14
• A premise of this paper is that the commercial exploitation of any copyrighted work is 
the plain evidence of its social importance. And, as I will try to explain, this social value is 
conferred either by the work's informational content ("informational" in its broadest sense)--
when the public has an interest in it-, or by the "secondary meaning" of that content--when, 
originally the lay, and/or religious authority, and later the owner of the copyright in that, work 
(distinct from its author), qeveloped an interest in it. For a correlation between the "social 
value" and "social importance" of a book, and its "commercial exploitation", see Justice 
Brennan's opinion in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. 
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413; 86 S. Ct. 975; 16 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1 Media 
L. Rep. 1390 (1966). 
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the 20th century moment in the evolution of national and regional or 
multinational statutes focused on literary and artistic works. The commercial 
focus--even obsession- found in the copyright regimes of the United States and 
the European Economic Community and its meJllbers, presented from the same 
previous perspective, is exemplified by the policies governing musical 
compositions created by members of collective societies. The third part (Book 
Ill) addresses the same issues from an even larger international perspective than 
the European Community and the United States, discussing the impact of 
copyright15 upon the developing countries and the growing role of plainly 
commercial international institutions such as GATf in this domain. 
In this paper I totally disagree with both express theories of the Copyright and Authorship 
systems' goals: In the first, the dissemination of information for the public welfare though 
private incentives, as the expressed legislative purpose, and in the second, the protection of the 
author as an author. 
Explained in a few words, I disagree because, in the first, as I try to demonstrate, a 
copyright statute--in any common law country--, represents a purely commercial public policy, 
because of the special "social value" of the traded goods, and, concerning the second, essentially 
a truism-belonging to civil law systems--, an author, in order to be protected as an author, has 
to have authored something, and that something will define his legal position, which 
consequentially will delimit her protection. Thus, in civil law countries as well though, the 
author is promoted as the central figure, what really interests national legislation is the eventual 
copyrighted goods, and their commercial distribution. 
15
• See, note no. 1. 
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Unfortunately, this paper fails to reach either a radical or an optimistic 
conclusion. This is the result of two prudent observations. First, due to the 
specifics of the exploitation of literary and artistic productions, authors have 
never succeeded without an "exploiter"16• It appears they must accept in one 
way or in another, their own spoliation--directly by an investor, or indirectly by 
authors' guilds17• Secondly, at the international level the transfer of information 
and technology has always been unidirectional (from developed to less developed 
peoples), and thus, present circumstances are hardly new. Consequently, this 
paper has only a very constrained, if any, importance; it marks what may well 
be a new style in legal writing--the "open paper"-, a counterpart to Umberto 
Eco's open novels. 18 
16
• Since the invention of the movable type printing press the author-writer has remained 
dependent on her publishers. On the origin of this reciprocal servitude, see A. R. Bertrand, "Le 
droit d'auteur et les droits voisins, • Masson, Paris, 1991, at 24 [hereinafter Bertrand, Le droit 
d'auteur]. 
17
• Usually they are called collective societies. 
18
• See for a theoretical approach of "open works", e.g., U. Eco "Opera aperta: forma e 
indeterminazione nelle poetiche contemporane" Milano: Bompiani, 1976. 
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BOOK I. GENESIS 
A. AS A COMMERCIAL REGULATION 
When Medieval Europe19 reached the sustainable level of a commercial 
exchange economy, the division of labor and its specialization and 
professionalisation increased sequentially, because communities produced more 
than they needed themselves, the trade had developed20 • By the latter part of 
the 13th century, this phenomenon generated a peculiar appreciation of cultural 
productions, even if restricted to a small elite21• Cultural and economic value 
started to merge. (As an example, books became worthy as something more than 
mere manuscripts, because of their rarity, and therefore became "such valuable 
19
• For the basic historical information discuss in this paper, see H. G. Koenigsberger, & 
A. Briggs, •A History of Europe", t.I. Koenigsberger "Medieval Europe 400-1500", and t.ll. 
Koenigsberger, "Early Modem Europe 1500-1789" Longman Inc., New York, 1991 [hereinafter 
Koenigsberger, t.1 and Koenigsberger, t.11]. 
· 
20
• On the beginning of trading in urban areas governed by professional corporations or 
guilds, see Koenigsberger, t.I. 144-7. 
21
• Usually only monks and clerks could then read and write. For example, Magna Carta, 
signed in 1215, was signed with signet rings, because the greater part of nobles couldn't write. 
On the social scale of that time, "Men of letters"--the literate--were inferior to "Men at Arms". 
SeeR. W. Jones, "Copyright and Trade-Marks". E.W. Stephens Co., Columbia Missouri, 1949, 
at 9 [hereinafter Jones, Copyright]. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that the number 
of books was not too important, and the literate 'elite' was really very restricted. 
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articles of property that they were often pledged as securing for loans. "22) 
Later23, efforts to develop mechanical inventions grew24 • Cities 
developed a new social and psychological environment25 where people invested 
both in business ventures and in the patronage of artists, thus encouraging a 
great flowering of creative activities26• Education and literacy spread to the lay 
urban public and provided the market·for the enormously increasing output of 
the printing press. Thus, a new form of industry and trade appeared: the book 
trade27 • 
22
• In Paris a public scandal was caused by exorbitant prices demanded for books by 
booksellers--also called stationarii--, and bookbrokers--also known as librarii. See H. G. Ball, 
"The Law of Copyright and Literary Property", Banks and Co., Albany, Mathew Bender, NY, 
1944 at 8 [hereinafter Ball, The Law of Copyright]. 
23
• Koenigsberger, t.1. 343-364. 
24
• An example of a mechanical invention from those days is the movable type printing 
press. 
25
• Koenigsberger, t.I at 364. 
26
• It was in the Italian cities where the artists first became conscious of their potential social 
role. Leonardo, when he portrayed himself as a wise old man with a beard, imitated "the 
traditional representation of God the Father". Durer might have thought of his role as creator 
"after the Creators", when he portrayed himself suggesting the image "which was usually given 
to Jesus Christ". Koenigsberger t.I, 374-5. 
n. Koenigsberger, t.11at155. By the time printing was invented in Europe, both stationarii 
and librarii were carrying on their trade in most of the European cities. See S. C. Masterson, 
"Copyright--History and Development", 28 Calif. L. Rev. 620, cited in Ball, The Law of 
Copyright at 9. On the connection between the printing press and the industry of printing and 
selling books, see also, A. C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
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From its beginning, this trade was no different than any other. As for any 
other trade it needed special guild protection against competitors. It was 
conscious perhaps, of the potentially free marketability of books at any place and 
time28, theoretically by almost anybody, without requiring a hard 
apprenticeship. Therefore, different categories of professionals involved in the 
book industry and the book trade asked authorities for so-called "exceptions," 
or "book-privileges" to protect them from competition in new printed books29 • 
These privileges were first enforced in the ltalian30 and German cities, 
Possession", in Ohio S. L. J., 523-5 (1990) [hereinafter Yen, Restoring the Natural Law]. 
28
• "Books were the first commodity that was mass-produced", and booksellers saw that 
profits would be greater if the exclusive right to make copies could be secured. Koenigsberger 
also noticed that the later European industrial revolution was inconceivable without this 
preliminary industrial-intellectual revolution. On the strict dependence between the books and 
printing technology, see. E. Eisenstein, "The Printing Press as an Agent of Change", 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980. 
The "copy-right" as the "right to make copies" is underlined in Jones, Copyright, at 69. 
On "copyright" as both the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are treated 
as commodities, and as a modern creature of the printing press, see M. Rose, "Authors and 
Owners. The Invention of Copyright", Harvard UP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1993, 
at 3 [hereinafter Rose, Authors and Owners]. 
29
• For more details, see E. Armstrong, "Before Copyright. The French Book-Privilege 
System. 1498-1526" Cambridge UP, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Armstrong, Before Copyright]. 
30
• The practice of protecting mechanical inventions through privileges originated in Venice 
in the 15th century. One century later it was adopted in other European states. In England these 
privileges first appear in 1518. See F. S. Siebert, "Freedom of the Press in England. 1476-1776" 
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highly commercialized areas. From a simple commercial monopoly--forbidding 
all other printers from the manufacture and sale of printed books31 in a certain 
sovereign geographic area-the privilege soon imposed restraints on two levels: 
First, the restrictions devolved from restraints applying to all books generally to 
specific protections of particular books32 ; and second from protections solely 
for the benefit of inventors33 , then expanding for the benefit of publishers34, 
Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1952, 33-40. 
31
• This commercial monopoly was first established in favor of the inventor or of the first 
person who introduced printing into a country or city where it had hitherto not been practiced. 
A privilege of this kind was successfully sought by Johann de Spira in September 1469 from the 
government of Venice, threatening anyone else who tried to start a press there with fines and 
with confiscation of his tools and his books. See, Armstrong, Before Copyright, at 2. Another 
example is provided by the Haller's privilege. He originally introduced printing in Cracovia, and 
obtained a general commercial privilege in any of the books he printed, id., at 8. In England and 
in France, these privileges appeared later, because those governments did not need to offer such 
exhaustive privileges in order to induce printers to come and work in their cities, id. at 21. 
32
• The earliest book-privilege introduced in a Germany city dates from 1479, Wurzburg, 
id., at 3. 
33
• For example, Jojann Schoeffer of Mainz, seeking a privilege in 1518 from the Emperor 
Maxilnilian I, made the plea, among·others, that his grandfather was the inventor of printing. 
On this ground he obtained the grant, id. at 1. 
34
• In France, for example, by the early sixteenth century, a very large number of firms were 
making their living out of the manufacture or sale of printed books. Therefore, a highly 
competitive situation developed especially in the protection of copies. In this context, by 1507, 
a leading Paris publisher secured a three-year grant for any book for which he should be the first 
person to publish it. Id. 21-2. 
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· and finally for authors35 • This eventual variety of· recipients of similar 
privileges suggests that "making books" was regarded as a unitary industrial 
activity. Even if they occupied different professions, each of them were entitled 
to protection36 on roughly equal grounds37• 
Therefore, both future different modem systems of protecting literary and 
artistic works38 evolved from a pure commercial book-monopoly. Perhaps it 
35
• Undoubtedly, authors could become professionals, and ask for a professional privilege, 
only when a certain level of production and consumption of printed materials was attained. 
However, even before that, authors might have obtained a commercial privilege. "The first 
author's privilege was one granted in Venice, in 1486. • According to the grant, the author could 
choose which printer would publish his book, and any other printer who published it would be 
fined 500 ducats. For more details, see Rose, Authors and Owners, at 10. 
36
• Certainly the most powerful members of the book trade were those who secured book-
privileges. In France, for example, with the statute of 1686, printing gained a general privilege 
belol].ging only to printers. I use "printer" to translate "libraire"- "term utilise pour designer les 
imprimeurs a partir du XVIeme siecle"; it could also be translated as publisher. See Bertrand, 
Le droit d'auteur, at 24. 
Thus, a contest between those who controlled the trade through the right to print the most 
valuable works and those excluded from power became fated. This struggle has continued within 
the metaphysical frame of the "copyright" through the succeeding centuries. See, Rose, Authors 
and Owners, 9-12 . 
.,, . In France, for example, the grant of a privilege was the result of a request directed to 
the state, whether to the royal chancery, to the Parliaments, or to officers of the Crown. It was 
regarded as a personal favor which cost the Crown nothing to give. Either printers or authors 
relied on virtually the same economic arguments in seeking privileges: The author invoked his 
labor and expenses, including the cost of printing, if he paid or intended to pay for it. The 
publishers put forward economic arguments for what "they had incurred·or planned to incur in 
securing and printing a new item." See, Armstrong, Before Copyright, 78-84. 
38
• Within the common-law system and the civil law system. see supra notes nos. 2 -3. 
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had aimed to encourage commerce in a new industry without costing its grantors 
anything. (Contrary they earned popularity through an act of genuine charitable 
humanitarianism.) 
However, its grantors' good deed was the result of the professional 
subjects' request when they felt the threat of competition. Whoever was involved 
in the book industry in a sovereign area sought as broad protection as possible--a 
general prohibition against any competitors from practicing the same activity39 
in that geographic area. 
For example, in early England, the principal publisher was not an 
individual, but a corporate entity-the Stationers' Company.40 They sought to 
39
• Another manner of book trade regulation--developecl in England-was the guild system. 
See supra nos. 36-8, and the text accompanying them. 
40
• For a detailed history, see, C. Blagden "The Stationers Company: A mstory, 1403-
1959", Allen & Unwin, London, 1960. 
The right to print a book was established through entry onto the Stationers' Company's 
register. They used the term "<;opy" to designate both the original manuscript and the right to 
print forever a particular book. It was the guild that authorized the system and also administered 
it: only its members-booksellers and printers-might own the copies. For details, see Rose, 
Authors and Owners 12-13. 
The stationers' copyright was an ideal instrument of monopoly for its owner. It was 
thought by its grantor to ensure a strict control of published material, providing, at the same 
time (as will be discussed), "a superior device of Censorship." See, L. R. Patterson & S. W. 
Lindberg, "The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights" at 19, 1991 [hereinafter 
Patterson, The Nature of Copyright], L. R. Patterson, "Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary 
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protect their industry under the threat of Scottish competitors41• 
In this stage they first used the term "copy right". It was never used in 
the meaning of a common law right, but as a "right" grounded on by-laws of 
the company in favor of its members42, and in this way they tried to use it later 
through legislative statutes. Therefore, the history of statutory copyright in 
Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition", in 17 Dayton L. Rev. 385, 
3 89 [hereinafter Patterson, Copyright Overextended]. 
41
• Until the first quarter of the sixteenth century, a high proportion of the printed books 
required in England was imported from abroad. For details, see E. Armstrong, "English 
purchases of printed books from the Continent 1465-1526", in English Historical Review, XCIV 
(1979), 268-90, cited in Armstrong, Before Copyright, at 21. 
The English publishers, who imported their product and faced competition, were the ones 
who promoted the future legislation--the Statute of Anne-in order to export their copyright 
control to Scotland. See D. Saunders, •Authorship and Copyright," London, 1992, 55-6 
[hereinafter Saunders, Authorship]. 
This, of course, is an early but surely significant example of the use of copyright as a 
means of international trade regulation. 
42
• In the Company's records the term "copy right" appeared for the first time in 1701, as 
a 'right' grounded on by-laws of the company in favor of its members, empowered in this sense 
by the Charter of Incorporation granted by Queen Mary in 1557. This Charter allowed the 
London printers, bookbinders, and booksellers to form themselves into a recognized guild of 
traders. In this regard, see A. Latman, "Latman's the Copyright Law" 6th ed. 1986, 3-4 
[hereinafter Latman's Copyright]; M. A. Leaffer, "Understanding Copyright Law" Matthew 
Bender, 1989 2-3 [hereinafter Leaffer, Understanding Copyright]; Saunders, Authorship, 47-8. 
According to Saunders, the copyright that legislators knew in 1710, despite the fact that 
the term is nowhere mentioned inside the statute, was this stationers' copy right, "a device 
formed in and by the book trade for the express purpose of protecting individual stationers' 
ownership of the right to print copies of works whose titles had been registered with the 
Company." Saunders, Authorship, at 48. 
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England43 , and 'its practice, which doubtless influenced both the Continent's 
laws44 as well as the English Colonies45 , illustrates quite well that 
copyright'6, has meant at least historically, a commercial regulation47 • 
43
• For details see, B. Kaplan, "An Unhurried View of Copyright", 1967, 3-9 [hereinafter 
Kaplan, An Unhurried View]; L. R. Patterson, "Copyright in IDstorical Perspective", 1968, at 
27. "If it can be said that 'copyright' existed before 1709, it might best be defined as 'stationer's 
copyright' or 'publisher's copyright'." "Copyright. Current Viewpoints on IDstory, Laws, 
Legislation" (A. Kent, & H. Laucour, eds), RR Bowker Co., New York, 1972, at 2. 
44
• At least for the reason that it was the first important legal regulation that benefitted 
everybody interested in the book trade-governmental authorities, businessmen, and authors--, 
France and the future Germany could not have escaped its influence. 
45
• On the heavy borrowing from England's Statute of Anne by the American Congress, see, 
Latman's Copyright, at 6; Leaffer, Understanding Copyright at 4; A. Latman, R. A. Gorman, 
and J. C. Ginsburg, "Copyright for the Nineties. Cases and Materials", 3d ed. 1989, at 4. L. 
Benjamin, "Tuning Up the Copyright Act: Substantial Similarity and Sound Recording 
Protections", in 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1177 (1991); Booi;styn, N. "Copyright Law," LCP BW, 
1981, at 4. 
On the relation between the American constitutional copyright clause-Art. 1, §8-, and 
the English common law copyright, see Saunders, Authorship at 152; L. H. Amdur, "Copyright 
Law and Practice". Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, 1936, at 1.; Fenning, "The oiigin 
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution", in 17 Geo. L.J. 109 (1929); Howell, 
"Howell's Copyright Law", BNA Inc., Washington, D.C. 4th ed., 1962 at 4 [hereinafter, 
Howell's Copyright]. 
On the general influence of the English common law copyright in American courts, see 
R. R. Shaw, "Literary Property in the United States", Scarecrow Press.,1950, at 9 [hereinafter 
Shaw, Literary Property]. 
46
• See supra note no. 1. 
47
• This is obvious for the book-privileges, considered by Mark Rose the first "genuine 
anticipation of copyright." (A different opinion concerning the connection between the two types 
of monopolist protection is expressed in Whale on Copyright at 2: "The system of privileges is 
not, however, the true ancestor of statutory copyright.• [hereinafter Whale on Copyright]). It 
explains the mechanism by which "the rights conferred by copyright" have been used "to restrain 
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a) A ROYAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
The Statute of Anne48- "A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by 
Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such 
Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned"49 --was the final act of 
Parliament's resistance to the full force of the booksellers' pleas to restore their 
control of the trade50 they had previously enjoyed, and which during the 17th 
century suffered a series of setback51• The stationers' arguments that they 
trade competition." MacQueen, "Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design". Aberdeen U .P. 
1989, at 2 [hereinafter MacQueen, Copyright, Competition]. 
48
• Reprinted in H. Ransom, "The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on an Act for the 
Encouragement of Leaming, 1710", Austin: U of Texas P, 1956, 109-17. 
49
• The original title was "A Bill for the Encouragement of Leaming and for Securing the 
Property of Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners thereof', Rose, Authors and Owners, 45-6. 
so. On the similarity between the interest of publishers in having a monopoly over the 
production of books and the interest of medieval guilds in having control over the production 
of a new technology, see A. R. Miller, and M. H. Davis, "Intellectual Property. Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyright", West Publishing, 2d ed. 1990, at 280 [hereinafter Miller and 
Davis, Intellectual Property]. 
si. By virtue of the decree which established the Stationer's Company in 1556, all published 
works in England had to be entered upon its register and in the name of some member of that 
company. In this way, and supported by the Star Chamber, the stationer successfully claimed 
the right to print and publish the work for himself, his heirs and assigns forever. See, Howell's 
Copyright at 2. Throughout the entire century before to codification, the publishers had the book 
trade comfortably to themselves. See P. Jaszi, "Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of "Authorship", Duke L. J. at 468 (1991) [hereinafter, Jaszi, Toward a Theory 
of Copyright]. 
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merely sought to vindicate the interests of the "rightful owner"-the rights of the 
author--had an unexpected effect. 
Certainly, the booksellers sought to secure their interests, through the new 
legal fiction52 of the auhtor's rights instead of the now hopeless traditional 
claim of protection of their profession53 • But ironically, Parliament adopted this 
strategy as a weapon against stationer's monopoly itselfi4 • 
Although labelled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," the statute was, "in fact, 
promoted primarily by the London-based fraternity of British publishers" (then designated 
"stationers" and "booksellers"). 
52
• The very passage of the Statute of Anne as well as substance has to be related to the 
political and cultural conditions, to the evolution of juridical thoughts, favorable to certain 
conceptions about ownership and rightful ownership, such as those developed by W. Blackstone, 
in his "Commentaries". In this cultural environment, the publishers found it more effective to 
use "the author's rights as a blind for their interests", see, Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, 
at 468. 
53
• Their "initial pleas were for new censorship legislation to protect the government (and 
themselves). Only when these pleas failed did they make their plea for a copyright to protect the 
author." L. R. Patterson, "Copyright and the 'Exclusive Right' of Authors" 1 Georgia J. of 
Intel. Prop. L. (1993) 1, 12. 
54
• With the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1694, and the invasion of independent printers 
into the sacred domain of the Stationer's Company, stationers could have applied to Parliament 
for a: law to protect their a.Ileged rights in perpetuity against those pirates. But, the Parliament, 
instead of recognizing their perpetua:l rights, proceeded to pass a law limiting the stationers' 
exclusive right of publication. .For details, see Drone, "Law of Property in Intellectua:I 
Productions", 1879, at 69. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, at 147. 
"Parliament enacted the Statute as a response to the booksellers' undesirable monopoly 
in the book selling business." Yen, Restoring the Natural Law, at 526. 
"The history of copyright law is largely the story of judicia:I and statutory reactions to 
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Therefore, the adoption of this new legal argument-the author's rights to 
property in his work55--to contemporary and present commentators alike, 
expressed nothing more than a compromise between commercial private 
demands and a government understanding of the power of the new merchandise. 
(Virtually all commentators have since agreed that the new statute was still "in 
its practical effect" a protection of "the J;>Ublisher's right to copy. "56) 
the resulting monopolistic restraints." Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, at 280. 
However, despite codification, during the greater part of the eighteen century, "the trade of 
bookselling and the facilities for printing and binding books were under the control of a small 
group of. London booksellers, who pursued a policy of exclusion and exercised a monopoly 
which they successfully maintained and profitably exploited until the last quarter of the century." 
Ball, The Law of Copyright, 15-6. 
55
• "The right brought into statutory existence in 1710 was the perfectly alienable right-it 
could be sold and traded--to engage in certain economic exchanges based on the mechanical 
duplicates of a work. As a trade regulation statute. the Act of 1710 neither assum¢ nor 
required any equivalence between the person of the copyright holder and the moral or aesthetic 
personality of the writer; rather, it delineated and attribµted the legal capacity to own copyright 
in a manner designed for the regulation of a specific economic activity--the making and trading 
in a printed commodity." Saunders, Authorship at 10. 
56
• For "some 150 years copyright was quite simply the right to copy and, exceptJor the 
implied right to publish, nothing else." Whale on Copyright" at 11. 
Kaplan also suggests that publishers rather than authors were the intended beneficiaries 
of the Statute of Anne. An Unhurried View of Copyright, 6-9. 
Even commentators who emphasize the anti-monopolistic (and anti-censorship) goal of 
the statute, agree that it was "in fact a trade regulation -statute." Patterson, Copyright 
Overextended at 399. 
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b) A ROYAL FAILURE FLOURISHED INTO 
REVOLUTIONARY DECREES 
In the 18th century, the situation under the French ancien regime57, was 
similar to the English copyright regime: the author became a nominal partner 
within the book trade58• As in England, the author's right remained just "a 
routine instrument of publishers' interests. "59 
In the 1770s, France, perhaps under the English challenge was seeking a 
general national codification of existing customary laws60• This desire would 
be fulfilled later under revolutionary ideology61• 
57
• Fundamentally commercial principles marked the French book-privilege system for its 
complete duration. R. Birn, "Malesherbes and the Call for a Free Press", in Revolution in Print. 
The Press in France, 1775-1800, (R. Darnton, and D. Roche, eds), Berkeley: U of California 
P. 1989, 131-5. 
58
• See, Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 25; Saunders, Authorship at 83. 
59
• Saunders, Authorship at 83. 
60
• The Napoleonic Civil Code-a post revolutionary codification-- was also the result of 
general and legal cultural accomplishments during the previous centuries. 
61
• The ancient network didn't fit neatly into an "aesthetic schema where the persona of the 
Romantic author provides the singular goal to which all earlier forms of authorship had to lead." 
Saunders, Authorship at 89. (The change in the legal language concerning the author's rights 
might be related to the ideology of the times. For example, it is likely that a central political 
figure of that time, Lamartine, the revolutionary poet, had a defining role in the language of the 
revolutionary codification.) 
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The eventual revolutionary decrees62 changed nothing63 "either in ideas 
or in legislation," except "the word property, it is true" replaced the word 
privilege, Laboulay, a 19th century French commentator, noticed64 • Thus the 
only real effect of codification65 was to transform what had been a royal 
privilege into a legal right of the publisher using the language of the right of the 
author, who reminded an incidental figure. The very fact, though, that the new 
legal scheme was articulated in terms of author's rights eventually allowed the 
author to participate formally in the publication process with no change, 
however, in his economic status. 
62
• See, Bertrand, Le Droit d'auteur, 26-8. 
63
• If there was a change it was political: instead of a royal privilege, it became a legal 
privilege. A capricious human choice was replaced with the power of the nation, perhaps in a 
sincere desire for a more stable and equitable 'justice'. In the Age of Enlightment and the 
Declaration of Human and Civic Rights, Le Chapelier agreed--concerning the real change in this 
field-- that "what was formerly effected in France by virtue of privileges granted by the king; 
henceforward it will be by the virtue of a law, a far wiser method and the only one that it is 
appropriate to use.• D. Becourt, "The French Revolution and the Authors' Right for a New 
Universalism" 143 R.I.D.A. 230, 258 (1990). 
64
• E. Laboulaye, "Etudes sur la propriete litteraire en France et en Angleterre. Suivies de 
trois discours prononces au Parlement d 'Angleterre par Sir T. Noon Talfourd", Auguste Durand, 
Paris, 1858: This "property is still a charitable grant from society." (Actually this was the 
nature of the book-privileges.) -
6S. See supra note no. 55 and the accompanying text. 
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This commercial grant adopted by revolutionary statutes66, with their 
formal attention to the author's.role, however impotent it might have been in 
practical terms, influenced the future continental domestic statutes. (This might 
be explained using tlie ripples theory67). Their influence is due either to an 
attachment to what has been praised as an individualistic system for the author's 
protection68 and which would achieve its culmination in German legislation69, 
66
• About the purely commercial effects of the revolutionary texts, see C. Hesse, "The 
Dilemmas of Republican Publishing, 1793-1799", unpublished paper, Library of Congress 
Symposium on Publishing and Readership in Revolutionary France and America, 20-1, cited in 
Saunders, Authorship, at 93. 
67
• The ripples theory, if it first appeared as a linguistic theory, explaining how new 
linguistic changes influence the pre-existing languages from center to margin, and at the margins 
of a certain geographic area the pure language might be found, now is used in almost all 
sciences to explain correlations between step .by step changes, irrelevant the direction center-
margin. For example, see B. Diefenbaucher, "Ripples of technology; new technologies impact 
companies from the outside in" Midrange Systems, November 9, 1993. 
68
• Contrary to the opinion expressed in this paper is the view that the French system is 
traditionally author-centric. In this sense, see B. Edelman, "Une loi substantiellement 
intemationale. I.a loi du 3 juillet sur les droits d'auteur et droits voisins", Journal du droit 
international, 114:563 (1987); J. C. Ginsburg, "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property 
in Revolutionary Franceand America". Tulsa L. Rev., 64:1009 (1990), and 147 R.I.D.A (1991) 
125; Saunders, Authorship 89-105; Monta, "The Concept of 'Copyright' versus the "Droit 
d'Auteur", 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 178 (1959). 
69
• In Germany, the lack of a centralized legal regulation of the book market--the modem 
unified German state was not created until 1870-left the book trade uncontrolled. In this context 
the author and publisher stood together •as partners in alliance" to protect their common 
merchandise against any unpaid use of it. Saunders Authorship, 106-9. 
Consequently, the Germanic countries, before unification and national legislation, had 
joined the interests of both business partners: the publisher and the author. The future German 
statutes, despite their very 'romantic' language might be understood in this sense. On the 
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or simple because the French legal code was widely adopted in toto (or nearly 
so) across Europe and beyond, and as a result, so were its literary and artistic 
property rules. 
c) A NEW COMMERCIAL POLICY 
In the United States70, unlike any other nation, the statutes passed by 
Congress dealing with copyright are founded upon Constitutional provisions 71 • 
The United States was the first political system which understood the real value 
of copyrighted works, establishing publishing and knowledge ("writings" and 
"science") as constitutionally valued. And the presence of the Copyright Clause 
proved it. The 1790 Act72, is above all an instrument of governmental 
influence of both English and French legislation in Germany, see G. Boytha, "The Justification 
of the Protection of Author's Rights as Reflected in Their Historical Development" 151 R.I.D.A. 
53, 84 (1992) 
70
• See supra note 43. 
71
• See supra note no. 43. 
For the Constitutional provisions respecting copyright, see M. B. Nimmer, "Copyright 
and Other Aspects of Law Pertaining to Literary, Musical and Artistic Works" 2d ed. West 
Publishing Co., 1978, 912. 
72
• See supra, note no. 43. 
This was the first American Copyright Act, modelled on the Statute of Anne, and setting 
the tone for future American statutes. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright, at 4. 
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"policing, "73 the regulation of an otherwise a free market, aimed simply at 
developing an infant publishing industry. It was clearly not necessary to impose 
protective legislation in those years at the very beginning of the establishment 
of American publishing74, so much as to encourage its development. Its relative 
lack of commercial restrictions, its implied freedom to publish widely--today 
called "piracy"--was a boon to publishers. 
73
• Without seeking to narrowly circumscribe the present paper within any philosophical 
context, in the circumstances of an American copyright law pursuant to the express constitutional 
infrastructure, it seems reasonably to postulate that its original purpose was encoui;agement of 
a "national uniformity" within the frame of a very important trade. Here, similarly to the 
Commercial Clause, the Framers "must have referred to a system of law coextensive" with and 
operating uniformly in, the whole country. 
There are cases in which commercial or maritime issues are expressly solved by at least 
passing reference to the Patent and Copyright Clause: Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, (60 
U.S. 393; 15 L. Eel. 691; 19 How. 393.term: 1856); In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (130 
U.S. 581; 32 L. Eel. 1068; 9 S. Ct. 623. 1889) the Supreme Court said that the United States 
"form, and for most important purposes, a single nation", and in all "commercial regulations, 
we are one and the same people." 
What else might the Framers of the American Nation have imagined when they 
established the Copyright Clause, without benefit to any other foreign constitution, if not to 
encourage a single book-market within the new federation's borders? By promoting the spread 
of a sole language for the entire population, they facilitated the fabrication of a new common 
civilization, and the rise of a new nation. 
Advocating this idea, see The Fred E. Sander (208 F. 724, D. C. W. D. Washington, 
N. D. 1913). 
74
• On the mutual relationship between the beginning of an American publishing industry 
which copied without cost the products of British authors and publishers, and the provisions of 
American copyright statutes, see Saunders, Authorship, at 155. 
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This brief review of copyright laws as private commercial regulations 
suggest the following: 
The regulation of book production and distribution appeared and spread in the 
world as a direct consequence of very pragmatical concerns75 • The book~ 
privileges--a creation of the Italian and German cities-expanded across Europe 
in order to secure an industry and a profession: printing and printers. When the 
English Statute of Anne-and later other continental and overseas statutes76--
invoked author's rights, it was to legitimize emotionally the existence of a 
75
• Certainly, that set of rules was induced by the technological revolution. "The fortunes 
of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with freedom of expression, on the 
one hand, and with technological improvements in means of dissemination, on the other." 
Kaplan, An Unhurried View, vii-viii. 
(For more about the necessity of the enforcement of copyright law for new technological 
methods of both reproduction and dissemination of works covered by such a law, see Nimmer, 
"Foreword: Two Copyright Crises", 15 UCLA L. Rev. 931, 931.) 
However, even if technology is regarded as the direct inducement of copyright laws, it 
might be understood by the fact that technology is an element immanent in human progress, and 
that the rise of economic, social, and psychological conditions which supplied the world 
information and made society informationally depended would have been impossible without 
technological progress. In such circumstances the application of a rule to police and to promote 
information, it became unavoidable and that rule was called "copyright." 
76
• On the relativity of which is influenced by which, see Ball, The Law of Copyright, at 18, 
criticizing the claim that the Statute of Anne owes its origin to Dutch influence and customs 
respecting monopolies. 
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national industrial policy in otherwise free market economy77, for the rest of 
society78 • 
The result is an extraordinary consideration given to the book trade. Why 
this occurred in publishing and, apparently, nowhere else (except perhaps 
mechanical inventions) is almost inexplicable. Perhaps, publishing received such 
consideration due to some premonition of its future role in the worldwide 
distribution of power. 
B. AS A COMMERCE WITH INFORMATION79 
77
• "Although the rights could have been awarded to the publishers directly, the chosen 
solution was to vest the rights initially in 'authors' , with the understanding that the publisher 
eventually will assume control.• Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, at 468. 
78
• On an identical phenomena of legitimacy in another area of intellectual property --trade 
marks-·, see M. H. Davis, "Death Of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark 
Use", in 19 Ga. L. Rev. 233 (1981). 
79
• If "copyright statutes" are commercial regulations, they have to regulate the trade of 
goods, meaning objects with social value. Indeed, they regulate commerce in information. 
Information interests the public at large and the government. The public at large is interested in 
knowledge for reasons unknown to me, and the government is interested in information in order 
to use it for reasons which are only slightly less unknown. 
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a) ADVOCATING CITIZENS' KNOWLEDGE 
Copyright regulations80, may be easier understood if they are divided into 
Copyright-common law-, and Authorship-civil law-- systems81 • While the 
Copyright system82 has protected communication of lmowledge based both on 
a pragmatic economic calculus as well as respect for personal authorial 
values83 , the Authorship system84 has sought legitimacy with obstination based 
80
• See, note no.1. 
81
• See supra notes nos. 1-3. 
82
• See supra note no. 2. 
83
• In my opinion, the modem text used by the American Framers to break with the old 
civilization and whose transparent purpose was to encourage the formation of a new nation 
through cultural production, created not only a pedestal but also its cage. Encouraging a new 
industry become a cage, in the sense that in the name of the author new formerly unimagined 
economic rights were vested and for a longer period of time than the few older rights which had 
been known. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) the Supreme 
Court utilized the "authorship" concept to justify that copyright could constitutionally extend to 
photographs. See, Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, 480. 
A strong relation has been created between authorship and the extension of copyright 
subject matter, in the sense that everything which is originated by a human author could be 
copyrighted. The "authorship" concept continued "(and continues) to be strategically deployed 
to extend copyright protection to new kinds of subject matter", id. 
Today, the irony is that "authorship," seen as a quality of human beings advantaged 
impersonal and corporate entrepreneurs who paid only a simple wage for the appropriation of 
their human-employees' creations. Consequently, all the advantages of this powerful exclusive 
monopoly do not seem to be used now, in the majority of cases, either to encourage creativity, 
or benefit the author, even if as secondary ·policy of the law ( e.g. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 
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solely on the authorial values as its reason for the protection of literary and 
artistic works85 • 
1. SHORT IDSTORY 
Before the invention of printing, the right of transcribing copies of a book 
was the right of every man86, justified by natural justice and the public welfare, 
which necessitated the widest possible diffusion of learning87• In the Italian and 
German cities, very advanced communities, a segment of society appeared, 
"which had virtually been absent from Europe since the collapse of the Roman 
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) characterized this author's reward as a secondary consideration). 
84
• See supra note no. 3. 
85
• Henry Desbois is France's leading modern exponent of the theory postulating substantial 
difference between Copyright and the "Droit d' Auteur", on the ground that the French system 
unconditionally protects the author. In "Le droit d'auteur en France" (3rd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 
1978, at 538), he writes that the French Parliament has repudiated the utilitarian concept of 
protecting works of authorship in order to stimulate literary and artistic activity. To the contrary, 
he concludes the author is protected in the new legislation just because of his own status of 
author. 
86
• See Ball, The Law of Copyright, at 21. 
.., . A revealing example of the deep connection between literature and mass communication 
in the Middle Ages, is that of the Italians who were so impressed with the achievements of 
Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, that the Tuscan dialect in which they wrote became the literary 
language "per excellence of the whole of Italy.• Koenigsberger, t.1, at 369. 
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Empire." This educated laity88, which represented not only the market, but 
whose very existence represented the reason for disseminating ideas, influenced 
the Europe intellectual life. 
2. THE ENGLISH PRE-INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY 
In England, a singular "path of economic rationality", demanded the 
enforcement of statutory protection of expressed ideas. In comparison with the 
previous system based on guild protectionism89, the new commercial statutory 
regime was regarded as progressive. (1) By limiting any owner's copyright 
monopoly --and in this way promoting dissemination of ideas and values of 
. 
88
• Even ifKoenigsberger (t.II, at 19), expressly referred only to the Christian laity, it does 
seem to me that his assumption applying equally to the entire community of literate European 
people. 
89
• Not only was competition between businessmen in the literary market eliminated by 
abolition of guild-type protection, but this eradication had also injured authors. Under guild 
protectionism, book production was encouraged, at least for the reason that stationers could 
afford publishing costs, by sharing them. 
About the damage the stationers' perpetual monopoly would have produced, see the 
opinion of Lord Karnes in Hinton v. Donaldson (1773) Mor 8307. Perpetuating that monopoly, 
he said, " will unavoidable raise the price of good books beyond the reach of ordinary readers." 
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mass-education--9(), and (2) authorizing others besides the stationers to join the 
book business91 the statute had liberal effects. Scholars agreed that it was the 
right policy for a prosperous 18th century92 : within a growing demand for 
consumer goods, a rapidly increasing number of local newspapers developed 
which reciprocally influenced the demand for literary entertainment and 
"people's desire for knowledge. "93 . 
The English legislation had the important intuition, in order to support the 
dissemination of ideas to emphasize the importance of dispatching works, that 
is of relating publication and the genesis of "copyright. II It makes the benefit of 
the book trade subject to publication. But this was decided by the case law; 
90
• In his opinion in Hinton v. Donaldson, Lord Karnes said that "a perpetual monopoly of 
books would prove more destructive to learning, and even to authors, than a second irruption 
of Goths and Vandals." (Cited in MacQueen, Copyright, Competition, 3-4.) 
To emphasize that the scope of copyright policy was to support mass education, the Act 
of 1842 began with the following words: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to 
Copyright and to afford greater Encouragement to the Production of Literary Works of Lasting 
to the World ... " Whale on Copyright; at 15. · 
91
• I.e. the authors, proprio nomine. 
92
• R. D. Mayo, "The English Novel in the Magazines 1740-1815," Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern UP, London: Oxford UP, 1962; R. A. Posner, "Law and Literature, A 
Misunderstood Relationship," Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1988, at 351; Saunders, 
Authorship, 54-5. 
93
• Koenigsberger, t.II, at 299. 
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Donaldson v. Becket94 found that an exclusive right of publication could only 
be established by statute for a limited period after publication95• 
3. THE FIRST INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY: THE 
UNITED STATES 
In America, the importance of publishing96 was stressed as in no other 
place97 • Congress, exercising for the first time its power vested in it by the 
Constitution in Art. I, § 898, "to promote the progress of science and useful 
94
• 4 Burrows, 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774), citation from I.atman's Copyright, at 3 (The 
quotations differ·from Rose's: 4 Burr 2408, 98 ER 257, in Rose, Authors at 172) 
95
• In this sense, see I.atman's Copyright at 3, Yen, Restoring the Natural I.aw, at 528. 
96
• About the meaning of "publish" and its derivatives, see Jones, Copyright, at 11, where 
the word 'published, is used in the sense of "to reveal" or "to make known", and "publish" 
means to issue copies to the public. See in the same sense Am. Inst. Architects v. Fenichel, · 
41 F.S. 146 COB 24: 45 (1941). 
97
• This is so perhaps because in the United States, as in no other place, the codification of 
common law copyright was prompted by new communications technology, which generated a 
new "national" economic sector: the entertainment industry. 
"The development of a medium of mass communication almost inevitably results in the 
development of a service industry", Patterson explains, making a parallel with development of 
the printing press which "led to copyright." Copyright Overextended at 392. 
98
• The Patent and Copyright Clause was adopted in final form without debate in a secret 
proceeding on September 5, 1787. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright, at 4. In the language of 
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arts "99 , articulated its extraordinary significance100• At the end of the 18th 
century, when most American cemeteries contained no more than one or two 
generations, at most, of graves, publication was extremely important for the 
task of creating a new sense of nationhood. 
In a technical sense, publication meant that commercial protection under 
state laws of book exploitation ceased101, with the possibility of either: (1) a 
broader copyright protection under the federal regime, or (2) its definitive loss. 
(The federal statutory protection was not originally received automatically by 
the Copyright Clause, "the dominant idea is to promote the dissemination of knowledge to 
enhance public welfare." id. 
99
• See Wheaton v. Peterson, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834). This case, Saunders says, 
"is the American counterpart of Donaldson v. Becket." See also Banks v. Manchester, 128 
U.S. 244, 225, cited Shaw, Literary Property, at 174; Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 
151, id. 
Even before the first federal statute was adopted, the states passed copyright acts with 
the same declared purpose, e.g., Connecticut passed a copyright act in 1783, which was entitled 
"An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius", in Act and Laws of Conn. Jan. Sess. 
1783. 
100
• Even if its meaning might seem obvious, due to the secrecy of the "committee 
proceedings which considered the copyright clause", there is no helpful Ameriean legislative 
history available to determine the real meaning or extent of the first copyright law. 1 M. 
Nimmer, "Nimmer on Copyright" (MB)@ 1.01 [A] (1985); S. Shoenfeld, "The Applicability 
of Eleventh Amendment Immunity under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976", 36 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 163, 163 (1986). 
101
• "Publication was the trigger mechanism that terminated state protection and activated 
federal protection.• Boorstyn, Copyright Law, at 4 
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publication alone102.) 
The drafters of United States copyright emphasized and relied upon the 
English model and rationale: to raise the level of mass education through the 
fruits of commerce in published works103 • Accordingly, the 1790 statute 
allowed the free importation, vending, reprinting and publishing of any book 
written or published abroad by any person not being a citizen of the States, to 
provide "affordable English-language reading matter for the growing 
population." 104 
102
.See above note no. 91. 
For more on the importance of the moment of publication, see Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus. 
210 U.S.346, 347: When •a work is published in print, the owner's common law rights are lost, 
and unless the publication be in accordance with the requirements of the statute, the statutory 
right is not secured.• This case, even if dated 1907, articulates a long legal tradition. 
(Common law copyright, for the purpose of this paper, may be defined as the perpetual 
right of "an author to his unpublished creations", which included "the right to decide when, if, 
and how to publish the work", granted by each state inside its borders. See, Miller and Davis, 
Intellectual Property, 281.) 
103
• "The federal Act of 1790 --'for the encouragement of learning by securing copies of 
maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies'-- treats copyright as being 
a protection for works that are 'useful'." Saunders, Authorship, at 155. 
104
• With a population smaller than Britain's but a reading population that was larger, the 
United States represented the largest literate public there had ever been, and larger editions and 
lowei:per-volume prices were the rule. J. Tebbe!, "A ffistory of Book Publishing in the United 
States: the Creation of an Industry 1630-1865", R.R. Bowker, NY, 1972, 157-9. If copyright 
was meant to create a literate population and it was effective at all, it certainly effective in the 
U.S .. 
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4. INFORMATIONAL POLICY ON THE OLD 
CONTINENT 
The continental moral right105 belonging to authors, always a source--
often a stereotype, sometimes a caricature--of the difference between English-
American and continental systems106, might be described as clear evidence of 
the state interest in promoting learning, the spread of knowledge, and 
communication. Even if adopted 'later than the "opposite," common law, 
copyright statutes, and thus that model was waiting to be pragmatically 
improved, in fact, the French revolutionary law explicitly provided just the 
author's pecuniary right in his work107• Far from being a legislative creation, 
the moral right108 is a sort of continental "common law" creation, in the sense 
105
• See the definition in "Whale on Copyright", at 14. 
106
• See Gainsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights, R.I.D.A. 125. 
1ITT. See, "La Ioi des 19-24juillet1793 relative aux droits de propriete d'ecnts en tout genre, 
des compositeurs de musique, des peintres et des dessinateurs", in Bertrand, Le droit d' auteur, 
27-8. 
108
• Each country member to the Berne Convention have ensured "moral rights" from the 
moment it joined it. United States, however, ensure "moral rights" very limited to just visual 
arts. . 
Nevertheless, when Monty Pyton--Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2<;1. Cir. 1976) is seen 
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that at its origin is the case law109• 
as a famous case of inoral rights, it became very interesting for the purpose of this paper, 
because it makes clear that so-called moral rights are granted not for the author's sake, but to 
protect the work. (For different opinions about this topic, see E. M. Brooks, "Titled' Justice: 
Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights after U.S. Adherence to the Berne COnvention," 77 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1431 (1989); J. Ginsburg, "Moral Rights in a Common Law System," Moral Rights 
Protection in a Copyright System, P. Anderson, and D. Saunders, eds., Institute for Cultural 
Policy Studies, Grifith U., 1992, 13-50.) 
In civil law countries, providing the other type of author's rights, is not a large or 
meaningful one: the author enjoys the right of recognition of his authorial quality, which means 
the right to be identified under his real/ chosen name; the right to be designated as the real 
author; and the right to be identified with her work. (For example, the 1957 French Copyright 
Act provides in art. 6: 
"L'auteur juit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualite et de son oeuvre. 
"Ce droit est attache a sa personne. 
"TI est perpetuel, inalienable, et imprescriptible. 
"TI est transmissible a cause de mort aux hentiers de !'auteur. 
"L' exercice peut en etre confere a un tiers en vertu de dispositions testamentaires." For the 
original textx, see Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, 723-44.) 
(I do not enjoy the role of forcing Gods from Olympus' cloudy peak. Actually I believe 
in them and in fact, they are innate to human thoughts. But, Gods live in Olympus because the 
public want them there, and authors in any legal system receive almost nothing more than what 
is due any other worker or investor. With or without an elaborate legal fiction, Shakespeare 
created plays and remains Shakespeare, needing no explanatory footnotes. Wherefore, why do 
we have such elaborate structures evidencing such legislative concern for the author's welfare, 
when all that is important for the society where she is living is his work? Isn't it because many 
others hide their own interests, behind the authors' , and legitimize them using the socially 
manipulated false belief, that the strong commercial monopoly is for the author's benefit? And 
what better way to stop any suspicious if not with the "moral rights" argument?) 
109
• Beginning with 1828, the "droit moral" surfaced in French judgments. See the decision 
of the Paris Appellate Court/ Cour de Paris, 11 January 1828.S.1828/30.2.5; Marquam c./v. 
Lehuby, Paris Lower Court/Tribunal Grande Instance, 22 August 1845, Table D.1845, cited 
in Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 219. 
The new right owes its appellation as "droit moral" to a scholar, Andre Morillot. He 
first used it in his article "De la personnalite du droit de publication qui appartient a un auteur 
vivant" in Revue critique de legislation at 29 (1872). 
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Grasping the inner nature of this right -that it cannot be assigned, 
remaining in the work itself110-, and its duration -lasting the work's life and 
The Moral Right/le droit moral was incorporated in the French legislation between 1900s 
and the 1930s. Id. 218-20. 
110
• Usually it is said that the moral right is a right of personality, and that it is 
misunderstood as an author's grant. But, when in 1785 Kant interpreted the content of the book 
as the speech of the author, and characterized it as "jus personalissimum" he created a doctrine 
ideally suited to protect books against distortion. 
Thus when a book's content is assimilated with human personality, an infringer can then 
easily be perceived in the public eye, that is in the sense of legitimacy, as a criminal. For a 
concise history of the evolution of "Urheberrecht", Boytha, The justification of the Protection, 
at 85. 
Another persuasive example that the moral right is not established for the author's 
benefit, but for the benefit of the work, to preserve the integrity of its content-that is to secure 
the social value of the work-- is the relatively recent Huston case. As Prof. Fran~n remarked 
(About the decision of the Appellate Court of Paris--Cour d' Appel, 4e Chambre--Juin 6, 1989, 
in 143 R.I.D.A. (1990) 339) its solution was predetermined by the case involving "The Kid" 
(the French Supreme Court--Cour de Cassation, lre Civ.-May 28, 1963. With respect to "The 
Kid", the French Court acknowledged Charlie Chaplin's right to oppose any alteration of his 
work's integrity--such as adding music to his silent film.) 
Concerning Huston's "Asphalt Jungle", the French Supreme Court-Cour de Cassation, 
May 28, 1991-, reversing the intermediary court decision, ruled also in favor of the work's 
integrity, and against its colorization. 
About that decision's echoes, see A. Kerever, "Addendum", 149 R.I.D.A. (1991) 15, 
and J. Ginsburg, and P. Sirinelli, •Author, Creation and Adaptation in Private International Law 
and French Domestic Law. Reflections Based on the Huston Case(l)" 150 R.I.D.A. (1991) 3. 
Therefore, what else is the effect of so called "moral rights"-- as rights of paternity and 
integrity--, if not to secure protection of the work's content, and of its original social value, 
preserving not only its initial information, but the consumer's right of access to and payment for 
the genuine material? 
See also above note no. 104. 
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not subject to author's or her assignee's. longevity111-, it might be suggested 
that the rationale of moral right is to pl"otect the communication of knowledge 
against any distortion or falsification. The moral right safeguards the public's 
interest in an undistorted work for its whole eXistence not the author's. In this 
way, it may be argued that in the last instance the moral right protects 
consumers against confusion and deception112, though clearly this the 
traditional domain of trademarks and unfair competition laws, not copyright. 
Accordingly, the moral right appears to be actually created in a desire to secure 
a mass-communication morality. 
b) GOVERNING THE PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE 
1. GENERALITIES 
-
The new product--the published book--had a major disadvantage for an 
111 See Bertrand, Le droit d'auteur, at 237: "Contrairement au droit moral qui est 
'perpetuel', les 'droits patrimoniaux ( ... ) d'auteur sont limites dans le temps."/ While the moral 
right is forever, the economic rights are limited in time. · 
112
• In this sense it may be argued that the function played by the moral right is as a kind 
of trade mark of the work, identifying for the consumer a reliable source: its author. For an 
overview of American trade mark protection, see Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, 146-
279. 
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article of commerce: instead of vanishing with the first act of consumption-as 
an apple-, to become no more than a memory, it remains capable of nourishing 
friends and generations, and to be used continually for shaping minds and filling 
needs. The same popular princes who encouraged printing as a Renaissance 
vogue113 were first to apprehend its danger. The printed word might imperil 
their popularity, for instance by spreading news and ideologies subversive to 
political regimes as never before. Consequently, the production of this new 
commodity became supervised. Not only were the secular princes interested in 
it, but so were religious leaders114• 
In Venice, where the first form of legal protection of literary production 
appeared --the book privilege-, the intertwining of the privilege system with 
censorship first surfaced. The compromise between copyright as a source of 
incentive and a means of censorship which the Venice solution represented was, 
113
• H. S. White, "The Copyright Dilemma". ALA. Chicago. 1978. at 4: "The attitude 
toward printing and publication, although favorable because of the Renaissance and Reformation, 
in some ways resembles the contemporary attitude toward plutonium. Both were considered 
good, perhaps even necessary, but fraught with the possibilities of explosive harm to church and 
state were they to fall into the hands of any but godly and loyal subjects." [hereinafter White, 
The Copyright Dilemma] 
114
• The Catholic "officials" were also threatened by the Reformation propaganda. 
Koenigsberger, t.II, 64-70. 
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for centuries, the European model115 • 
2. THE ENGLISH PUBLIC CENSORSIIlP 
The Statute of Anne appeared to be a formal separation of copyright and 
censorship116• Even though it was "a successor to a series of privileges, 
11.S. Rose, Authors and Owners, at 11: In Venice, in the middle years of the sixteenth 
century, "a guild of printers and booksellers. was organized as an instrument for government 
surveillance of the press. " 
116
• Rose, Authors and Owners, at 16 and 48. 
"In 1556 Queen Mary incorporated the Stationers Company with extensive powers for 
the suppression of obnoxious books.(.-) In 1585 a decree of the Star Chamber required the 
licensing of every book or other publication and prohibited the printing of any book in violation 
of any ordinance of the Stationers Company." Ball, the Law of Copyright, at 9. 
Printing was subject to the orders of the Star Chamber so that the Government and the 
Church could exercise effective censorship and prevent seditious or heretical works from getting 
into print. Hallam, 1 "Constitutional History", 238, cited in Latman's Copyright, at 2. 
Henry VIII's printers' regulation act, officially titled "An Act for preventing the frequent 
Abuses in printing seditious treasonable and unlincesed Books and Pamphlets and for regulating 
of Printing and Printing Press" was designed to prevent the printing and sale of "heretical 
schismatical blasphemous seditious and treasonable Bookes, Pamphlets and Papers" ("Statutes 
of the Realm" 5:428); Rose, Authors and Owners, at 31. 
Queen Elizabeth I was also concerned about controlling what was published, and used 
a "very stringent and efficient system of licensing.• The stationers were "essentially printers or 
publishers, to whom the government gave• for censorship reasons, a monopoly which "carried 
the seeds of copyright.• White, The Copyright Dilemma at 4. 
"Copyright in Historical Perspective" 1968. This function might explain the Crown's 
claims of rights regarding the use of Bills, Acts of Parliament, Statutory Rules and Orders, 
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monopolies, decrees, and licensing acts in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century" 
primarily designed to maintain governmental control of printing117 it was 
nevertheless regarded as severing the merged interests of government and the 
book industry. 
3. A CONTINENTAL ATTITUDE 
i) THE FRENCH ATTITUDE 
A similarly express system of monopolistic control of the book market 
could have been found under the French ancien regime. The system of book 
privileges was described as a "coalition of interests between censors and traders 
--the royal government and the printer-bookseller associates of the Communaute 
des Imprimeurs et Libraires de Paris. "118 Governmental censorship continued 
Statutory Instruments, Parliamentary Papers, Hansards, papers. of Government departments, 
Ministry of Defence maps and Ordinance Survey publications, "independently of any question 
of prerogative.• J. A. L. Sterling & M. C. L. Carpenter, "Copyright Law in the United 
Kingdom and the Rights of Performers, Authors and Composers in Europe", Legal Books PTY, 
London, 1986 at 105 [hereinafter Sterling, Copyright Law]. 
117
• Copyright. Current Viewpoints on History, at 1. 
118
• The "cement of this coalition was the reliable power of exclusion, both of counter-
orthodoxy and of non-establishment Parisian and provincial printers and booksellers." Saunders, 
Authorship, at 84. 
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in France until the Revolution, when for political reasons--the radical rejection 
of the oppressive practices associated with the ancien regime--,it was abolished 
along with the privilege system119• 
ii) A GOTIDC ATTITUDE 
When a "national" regulation of the book market was enforced in 
Germany in the 1840s, it was influenced by the powerful German philosophical 
texts120 , which self-consciously promoted its authors' interests. It did not 
specifically or expressly embrace censorship, due perhaps to two phenomena: 
(1) German nationalism had arrived making it less likely that the loyalty of 
German subjects towards their secular heads could be threaten. (2) And on the 
other hand, in Christian terms, Germany was the Reformation country, which 
would not tolerate reminders of religious censorial system121 • 
119
• On August 4, 1789 the privileged were abolished and on August 26 "La d&:laration des 
droits de 1 'homme et du citoyen" was adopted. This became an opportunity to change the literary 
property policies. On the author's rights in this context, see "Bienvenue a la loi" 19 R.I.D.A., 
1958, at 9. 
120
• See, I. Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals. Part 1: The Metaphysical Elements of 
Justice", trans. J. Ladd. Bobbs-Merrill. NY. 1965. 
121
• For logical reasons it couldn't be against it. 
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In this context, the metamorphosis of what had been book privileges 
metamorphose into statutory form assumed a very sophisticated and commercial 
profile. For better or worse, legal fictions legitimized the author's right in his 
work. But even if the German statutory language may be regarded as 
"romantic"-for instance, the author's right cannot be assigned, only licensed-
nothing suggests an "author-centric" system, that is that the author was the sole 
and true object of legislation122• 
Germany is the place where the author was first identified, in a sense of 
immanency, with his work, and, unfortunately, the place where people have 
always been most effectively controlled by government. Excluding any 
intermediary assignee between the author and his work, the German legislation 
in a sense ratified German philosophy concerning authorship. From the moment 
of its genesis the only responsible party for a book's content was its author. 
Thus, the statutory language might be read more as a philosophical statement 
122
• A relevant example is offered by the present Gennan Copyright Law of 1965. By its 
terms, "Copyright shall protect the author with respect to his intellectual and personal relations 
to the work, and also with respect to the utilization of the work." (UNESCO translation). Since 
one element of the author's right is conceived of as linassignable, and that element "is an integral 
part of a single right, it follows that the right cannot be assigned (that is, the ownership 
transferred), although it can pass by testamentary· disposition. " Whale on Copyright, at 15. 
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and less as a democratic proof'23 • 
4. THE UNITED STATES AND·CENSORSHIP 
The form of copyright protection promoted and adopted by the United 
States seems formally oriented towards one major goal: mass education124• As 
one example, the earliest statutory subject matter was obviously limited to works 
of sheer information such as maps and charts, and in the form~ sense, it was 
at the end where the word books appears. 
It may be more than mere speculation to suspect early American copyright 
for a reluctant treatment of pooks125; the Framers' attitude towards works of 
123
• Fichte and Kant constructed the rationale for literary property in Germany, known as 
"Urheberrecht" .For details, see Saunders, Authorship, 106-21. 
124
• I say "formally", because American copyright law is also viewed as "a descendant of 
the British Crown's program of censorship through an elaborate licensing scheme for 
publishers." "Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced 
Technological Era". 96 Harvard L. Rev. at 450. 
125
• By the terms of the Copyright Act of 1790, indeed, technically "books" were 
copyrightable without qualification. As Jefferson's contemporaneous comments show, works of 
fiction were not at all desirable and/ or necessary for the intellectual formation of a new nation. 
This particular attitude seems to have influenced American case law concerning the allowance 
of statutory copyright protection. 
The idea of "authorship" as a major condition of book protection developed as the 
beginning and end of any further subject matter. And I suggest, with it developed a 
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fiction was certainly rather equivocal. Certainly works of fiction did not really 
satisfy the federal policy of encouraging mass Iearning126 understood in light 
of Jefferson's precepts127• (Not only did this attitude arguably influence the 
cultural tastes of the Framers' epoch, but it has marked the overall 
jurisprudential attitude towards copyright subject matter, which was never 
subject to any recognition or assessment of aesthetic values128.) 
transformation of the idea of author and his/her protection from the object of protection to 
simply the right holder. The "cornerstone of American copyright law"--Wheaton v. Paterson, 
decided in 1834--, narrowed the quality of the copyright owner to simply the one originating the 
"book". In this order of the development of ideas, the only articulable goal of copyright becomes 
simply the protection of the fruits of human labor. How this umbilical relationship evolved is 
a later question for this paper. 
126
• Perhaps, a distinct relationship could be postulated relating to the development or 
encouragement of a facility for assimilating information, i.e. science, in order to encourage its 
more informational production later. 
127. •A great obstacle to good education is the inordinate passion prevalent for novels, 
and the time lost in that reading which should be instructively employed". T. Jefferson, "The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson" vol. 15. ed. A. A. Lipscombe, Washington, D.C. 1903 (no pub) 
at 166, cited in Saunders, Authorship, at 254. 
128
• Perhaps, to achieve mass education it was necessary also to encourage a homogenization 
of cultural tastes, and to support works of nude information, which the 18th century novel 
definitely was not. The Constitutional Copyright Clause, in light of the First Amendment, is 
usually treated as a fonn of protection of free expressed thoughts, with the only early condition 
being that they be originated by American citizens. 
In 1903, Justice Holmes decided as a logical extension of this axiom, that no matter how 
"poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239. 
On the incorporation of free speech values the copyright clause of the Constitution, see, 
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Thus with a copyright regime embracing a very narrow range of purely 
informational works, a stated policy supporting mass education, and an 
underlying goal of encouraging a national publishing industry, it would be 
difficult to imagine governmental censorship as even a disguised policy129• The 
sole role of the government seems to have been effectively intervention cabined 
within the express terms of an admittedly narrow copyright statute. 
Thus, aside from the statute, the publishing industry was almost 
uncontrolled. At that time the publishing industry was concentrated more on 
imported books, and this apparent lack of federal policy effectively advantaged 
both businessmen and consumers by lower prices on the American market, and 
in fact on average four times less expensive than those on the British 
L. R. Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use", in 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1987, p.l. 
129
• See also infra note no. 138. 
There could be no governmental censorship in the classical meaning of enforced rules 
prohibiting certain publications. However, censorship of information, whether directly by the 
government or indirectly by other institutional groups for purportedly economic or other reasons 
is a part of any society, the difference being basically ideological. 
The new kind of censorship accomplished by virtue of copyright law in the 20th century 
is basically exercised by the owner of copyrighted work, usually distinct from the author, ergo 
by a private authority. 





Quite obviously, books were the first important copyrighted works in 
human civilization: Through them people were informed while, paradoxically, 
governments were protected. 
The economic history of book production and the history of copyright131 
are one and the same. Over several centuries, the economic role of books 
changed, altering their authors' and publisher' rank also. Books have obviously 
unique social value, because of their advantage of being both a depository and 
accelerator of knowledge, as well, of course, as an irreplaceable source of 
pleasure. Therefore, a wide range of social groups including but going far 
130
• The biggest American firms grew "to dwarf their transatlantic counterparts." There was 
nothing in London to rival Harper Brothers who, by mid-century, occupied seven five-store 
buildings and turned out over 2,000,000 volumes a year. 
And, the same author adds, "as a rule of thumb, the American operated at four times the 
size of edition and a quarter of the cost of the British publishers." However, when the British 
author or publisher "had authorized an American publisher to reproduce their works for the 
American market, in some instances they received ex gratia payments from the latter." 
Saunders, Authorship, at 156. 
131
• See note no. 1. 
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beyond merely, lay and/or religious authorities, have always had a keen stake 
in their commerce. 
Among other economic and cultural qualities, books possess an 
unchallenged superiority over any other source of information: When they 
ceased b~ing an elite source of information or of culture they became relatively 
cheap commodities, and with their greater dissemination they have tended to 
become even cheaper. Many economic and political factors have been favorable 
to book production ( e.g., educational systems, library policies, as well as the 
increase in leisure time), and they in their turn demonstrate their own sensitivity 
to the increasing influence of books in society. 
During this time, while the author's role has been more as an object of 
social gratitude and philosophical schools (generating for instance, an enlighten 
statutory language, especially in Europe132), the publishing community has 
been more keenly aware of its social tasks and functions, developing an 
economically powerful base. Organized in professional guilds, publishers had 
originally received only the commercial monopoly in the authors' works 
132
• See, Ph. Gaudrat, "Le point de vue d'un auteur sur la titularite"/"An Author's Point of 
View about Authorship,• Le droit d'auteur aujourd'hui, Larnberterie, I. (ed.) C.N.R.S 1991, 
43. 
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produced with the publishers' money. Later, on the basis of their ideological 
justification--the author's natural rights--, publishers shared the potential 
economic benefits, theoretically, with the works' authors. 
With the increasing task and burden of the distribution and dissemination 
of books, the role of the publisher has changed dramatically in the last two 
centuries. Had publishers never regarded their income until then as due to 
anything but the authors' creations, and not necessarily to their own activities, 
they would certainly do so now with the intensive development of book 
exploitation. With the maturation of the publishing professions (editorial, 
production, and distribution), and the alienating effects of modern industrial 
Western civilizations, the publisher gained the apparently good reasons to 
explain to the author, that royalties "do not fall from heaven, but are largely the 
fruit" 133 of the publishers' efforts. Publishing as an economic activity certainly 
133
• L. van Krevelen, "The Information Society and the Right of the Publisher'', 
Intemationales Urheberrechts-Symposium, Heidelberg, 24-5 April 1986, J. Schweitzer Verlag, 
Miinchen, 1986, 100-1 [hereinafter Internationales Urheberrechts]. 
According to van Krevelen, the publishing monopolies' escape the abolition of the French 
revolution thanks to the theory that they were in fact property rights (property was regarded as 
a fundamental right) and not feudal rights. Intemationales Urheberrechts at 90. (Perhaps this 
means an implied acceptance of the publisher's real status as a Venician merchant who uses his 
relationship with the author to promote his own interest, justifying that interest lll! a property 
right.) 
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flourished and the role of the publishers was so economically key that the role 
of the author inevitably diminished. 
Consequently, it . seems more accurate to claim that the publisher's saga 
(not the author's) and copyright history134 are one and the same: The publisher 
forced the legislator's hand in adopting favorable copyright statutes, and these 
laws have reflected commercial policies of an ordinary (though so protected that 
"ordinary" seems to insult those other entrepreneurs forced to contend with truly 
competitive conditions) trade. 
What remains wrong in this calculus is its terms. Publishers, and others 
with an interest in copyrighted works, did not play the game on their own 
On the current relations between publishers and authors, like the author's payment under 
different national statutes, see C. Colombet, "Grands principes du droit d'auteur et des droits 
voisins dans le monde. Approche de droit compare" Litec, UNFSCO, 1990, 88-93, although, 
unfortunately, this is not a vary reliable source for many domestic statutes. 
Although troublesome in many respects, a case such as Harper & Row, Publishers v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539; 105 S.Ct. 2218; 85 L.Ed. 2d 588; 53 U.S.L.W.4562; 225 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073; 11 Media L. Rep. 1969 (1985) might be regarded as a case of unfair 
competition between two publishers in the battle for the optimum profit from an author's 
manuscript. This is even more like an unfair competition case when the (mis?)conduct of the 
defendant is considerably key, as seems to be the case upon a close reading. 
134
• See note no. 1. 
On the similarity between Anglo-American eopyright and the author's rightldroit d'auteur 
system with respect to author-publisher relations, see D. Ladd, "The Utility of a Publisher's 
Right", Internationales Urheberrechts, at. 90. 
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merits, but instead relied on the argument that they were only vindicating the 
author's natural rights in her own work. This situation, however, generally 
accepted with little or no question, should by rights last nevermore, because that 
which publishers claim to have secure under copyright135 is not Poe's raven, 
but its commercialization. 
135
• See supra note no. 1. 
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BOOK II. SEASONING 
A. COPYRIGHT IN 20TH CENTURY. GENERALITIES 
My unequivocal opinion that historically, copyright merely regulated a 
particular business concerning an even more particular merchandise, and never 
. attempted for romantic or other reasons to vest meaningful rights in the author, 
remains the same for events in this century. Ideas are valuable by their very 
essence: but they become marketable only when they achieve a social value, that 
is when communicated to others, and that occurs when they became published 
"writings." 136 
As described above137, they produce a benefit if secured by commercial 
monopoly138• This monopoly, however, only advantages its actual recipients 
136
• The term "writings" is used in its broad American constitutional meaning. 
137
• See, Book I, first part. 
138. These beneficiaries are the merchants of writings. To legitimize their interests in 
the eyes of rest of an otherwise free market society the author's own right was created and 
included in this lucrative game. This legitimacy has been so impeccably managed that for almost 
300 years under its protection, merchants have been able to expand their rights to an 
approximate 75-100-year monopoly, and it remains apparently honest to everybody. 
Under the Berne Convention, which made the first attempt toward copyright 
universalization, while promoting the commercial monopoly in the author's name, the one who's 
interests was served was in the 19th century the publisher, and today the author's employer, 
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of course, while inhibiting the others' access to such writings, and therefore 
paradoxically restricts their social significance. 139 
assignee, or licensee. From. the perspective of a qui pro quo in copyright Bogulslavsky's words 
might contain some truth, when he argued that the Convention was established "in the interests 
of publishing and other companies.• M. M. Boguslavsky, "Copyright in International Relations: 
International Protection of Literary and Scientific Works" (trans. N. Poulet), Catterns, Sidney, 
1979, at 190. 
139.The originally public censorship is now exercised by the private owner, often 
inhibiting others' cultural and political access to 'their' works. Perhaps in this sense, Gordon 
speaks about a "balkanization" of this issue. "Towards a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms 
of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship", in 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1009, 1032-49 
(1990). The complete control of the copyright holder to perform her work, as a specific form 
of private censorship is discussed also by Patterson, Copyright Overextended at 393. 
The corporate owner-the prominent copyright holder--exercises a truly effective 
censorship: it has the power to decide what, when and in which way the work will be 
disseminated. When "The New York Times" tells its readers that they will find inside •All the 
News That's Fit to Print", that is a sly consequence of private censorship. (There is of course 
the possibility that the government itself could control its copyrighted items. However, the 
Supreme Court ruled against a tax limited just to the press, exempting other media, because it 
"raises concerns about censorship of critical information and opinion.• Leathers v. Medlock, 
113 L. Ed. 2d 494, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (1991)) 
The American "fair use" doctrine, it might be described originating as a policy 
"promoting the diffusion of ideas." "Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of 
Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values• 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1306 (1991). (Until 
1976 the fair use doctrine was a case law creation, and before the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in only two case implicating this doctrine. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F .2d 
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia 
Broadcast Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) and Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 
376 (1975). W. W. Fisher ill, "Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine" 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661, 
1663 (1988).) 
•An expanded fair use doctrine can be used to limit the inherent ability of television 
broadcasters to control and limit access to their works through the protections granted by the 
copyright laws." S. S. Zimmermann, "A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First 
Amendment Conflict", in 35 Emory L.J. 163, 189, (1986). 
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Consequently, even if the technical legal and social status of today's 
writings remains the same, it has gained in fact a host of new aspects140 
The seemingly endless discussion about the goals of the American Copyright Clause 
might also be explained as an effort to find ways to elude private censorship. In numerous cases 
judges have emphasired that ultimately the goal of the Copyright Clause--and Act-is to serve 
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts. See, 
International News Serv. v. As.5oclated Pres.s, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
This goal, if real, does not contradict the commercial character of the Copyright Clause 
and Act. It merely provides a justification for government regulation of this market, 
acknowledging its failure as a free competitive one. 
140
• In their recent book, L. R. Paterson, and S. W. Lindberg, ("The Nature of Copyright: 
A Law of Users' Rights" Athens: Georgia U.P. 1991 [reviewed by, Loren, L. P. "1992 Survey 
of Books Relating to the Law; VII. Tort and Commercial Law: The Nature of Copyright: A Law 
of Users' Rights" in 990 Mich. L. Rev. 1624 (1992), and "Recent publication: The nature of 
Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights" in 106 Harv. L. Rev. 975 (1993)]) address different 
interpretations of American copyright law. They propose another reading of the law, as a matter 
of policy choices-- a statutory grant of a "limited monopoly designed to maximize the 
distribution of information", also providing "reasonable rights" for its users (p.14). 
Facing a "public myth" based on "philosophical precepts of Hohfeld, Hegel, Locke 
(discussed in J. Hughes, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property", in 77 Geo. L. J. 287 (1988), 
L. J. Lacey, "Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights", in 1989 Duke L.J. 1532, Yen, Restoring 
the Natural Law), and opposing the economic analyses of copyright law (augmented in S. 
Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs", 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970), W. J. Gordon, "Fair Use as Market 
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors", 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982), J. Cirace, "When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted for 
Purposes Other than Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony 
Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases", in 28 St. Louis U. L. J. 647 (1984), Fisher, 
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 1698-1744; W. M. Landes, R. A. Posner, "An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law", in 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989), J. Litman, "Copyright as Myth", 
53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 (1991)), they deal with a recurrent issue: copyright as a product of the 
community of industries it affects. Recently these particular aspects of "writings"' regime under 
the copyright law were discussed in A. R. Miller, "Copyright Protection For Computer 
Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since Contu?" in 106 
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generated by new commercial interests, with new and more wide-ranging aims 
and powers. Because . of the special configuration141 of musical works, and 
their a distinctive assortment of "copy rights", they serve the best to support my 
opinion regarding current national copyright policies. 
Harv. L. Rev. 9n (1993), and C. H. Settlemeyer ID, "Between Thought and Possession: 
Artists' 'Moral Rights' and Public Access to Creative Works", in 81 Geo. L. J. 2291 (1993). 
141
• In the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, for example, musical works, which are already 
copyright subject matter--§ 102 (a)(2)-, if performed and recorded become new copyright 
subject matter: sound recordings- §102 (a)(7), and also newly exist as "derivative works"--§101. 
A movie soundtrack is considered a literary work at both the national and international 
levels, but the same recorded music released as a sound recording will be treated differently, 
under both domestic and international regimes. See N. Turkewitz, •Authors' Rights Are Dead" 
38 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 41, 44, (1990) Cheteinafter, Turkewitz, Authors' Rights]. 
With respect to producers of sound recordings, in Europe they hold neighboring rights 
even if they have or not copyright as such in sound recordings. See Council of Europe. Human 
Rights. Mass Media Files no. 5. Intellectual Property Rights and Cable Distribution of 
Television Programs. Strasbourg 1983, 6-8. The English producers, and those whose domestic 
laws are influenced by U.K. statutes have copyright in sound recordings, see P. Stone, 
"Copyright Law in the United Kingdom and the European Community". The Athlone Press, 
London, 1990, at 27 [hereinafter Stone, Copyright Law]; P. Groves, "Copyright & Designs 
Law. A Question of Balance. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988", Graham & 
Trotman, London, 1991, 31; Sterling, Copyright Law at 414. 
The Cyprus Copyright Law, for example, was identical to the 1911 U.K. Copyright Act 
until 1978 when a domestic law influenced by the U.K. law came into force. See A. C. 
Evangelou, "Intellectual Property Law" 29 Cyprus L. Rev. 4644, 4646 (1990). 
This kind of copyright, in both sound recordings and broadcast transmissions, is called 
"entrepreneurial copyright," by W. R. Cornish in "Intellectual Property", London, 19s1"300. 
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B. AMERIGAN COPYRIGHTED MUSIC 
Musical works have been subject to copyright under American law since 
1831142• Authors have been vested with all the exclusive rights provided in 
each version of the copyright statute143 • 
When a composer doesn't work for hire144, and theoretically therefore, 
is the holder of all statutory rights, he actually enjoys a far less powerful 
142
• In 1831 the first general revision of the original act of 1790 occurred. With the Act of 
February 3, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436, the Copyright Act extended its protection to 
musical compositions. See Latman's Copyright at 7. 
143
• The exclusive rights in copyrighted works under 1976 Act U.S.C. are the following: 
(1) to reproduce it in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon it; 
(3) to distribute its copies or phonorecords to the public by sale-or other transfer of ownership, 
or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4)in the case of literary, musical ( ..• )works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical( ... ) works, to display it publicly. 
144
• In the most common circumstances, the producer of television programs and films retains 
a composer to write the music for the production. (E.g., Tr. 3303). In the typical "composer-
for-hire" agreement, the composer is required to perform various service in addition to 
composing. These includes orchestration, conducting, hiring of musicians and spotting. (e.g., 
AX 312 at 23) Under such "composer-for-hire" contracts, the producer commonly arranges for 
the performance rights to be assigned to its own in-house publishing subsidiary or affiliate. Thus 
the publisher typically retains the copyright and the right directly to license the performance 
of the muSic, and "the composer and publisher share equally in performance fees." (Tr. 565-66, 
1433, 1615-16, 3300-02, 3463-66; AX310 at 41-43, 46-48 & Exh. 1 at P 3(h); AX 312 at 11-
13; AX 358 & DX 857, Tab 1 at 16-21; AX 345 & DX 858, Tab 2 at 1802-05; AX 351 & 
DX861 at 87-88.) United States of America v. American Society pf Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, Civ. 13-95 (WCC) S.D.N.Y.,.1993, Copy. L. Rep. (CCII) P27,088; 1993-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCII) P70,153. 
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position than all other authors. In many ways- she is just a legal smoke screen 
for the entertainment industry, playing the role of its totem (in the freudian 
sense145), as well as that of a pedestal for American celebrities.146 
a) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE THE MUSIC IN 
PHONORECORDS AND TO AUTHORIZE SOUND 
RECORDINGS 
Prior to the 1909 Act, composers had no rights in phonorecords147• 
145
• S. Freud, "Totem und Tabu" [authorized English translation with introduction by Brill, 
A.A., "Totem and Taboo; Resemblances Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics"], Moffat, 
Yard and Co., NY, 1918. 
146
• These celebrities include those mentioned in C. Vinzant, "How Celebrities Cost You, 
the Little Guy, Big Bucks Through the Fabulousness-Added Tax~, Spy, February 1994, 35-40. 
The role of the musical composer in present American society is a product and a cause 
of the influence of the North American pop-culture across the world. See e.g., J. Rockwell, 
"The New Colossus: American Culture as Power Export", NY Times, January 30, 1994, sect. 
2, at 1. 
147
• The 1909 copyright revision gave "some protection to the composers of underlying 
musi~ works in order to vitiate part of the harshness of White-Smith." White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co., v. Apollo Co. (209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.ed. 655 (1908)) which held 
"that piano rolls were not copies of the underlying musical composition they caused a piano 
player to reproduce, because piano rolls could not be read or deciphered by the naked eye." 
Miller and Davis, Intellectual Property, at 313. 
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Under the 1909 legislation, composers gained the exclusive right to authorize the 
production of a special kind of copy of his music-the phcmorecord. If it were 
just a copy in another medium of the musical composition, the sound recorded 
in it would soon be statutorily treated as an independently copyrighted subject 
matter148 , and at the same time, a derivative work of the underlying musical 
composition. 
A sound recording (as treated by the 1976 Act), is the merged product 
between recording technology, musical performance and the underlying music, 
or otherwise the result of an affixation of captured or recaptured sound of the 
performed music149• In terms of the composer's legal interest, a second sound 
148
• In the music industry, Neil Turkewitz notices, "the record company invests in the 
performances of musical compositions of authors and creates a new and original work," -a 
phonorecord. The sale of that end product "produces benefits for all the creative parties--the 
author of the musical composition, the performers, musicians, sound engineers, etc." 
Accordingly, the author concludes that "to ensure adequate compensation for all the 
parties, it is essential that record companies are able to protect their works for at least fifty years 
and to make decisions about how to control the distribution of their works to the public." 
Authors' Rights, 43. 
149
• About the music industry--including music publishing and sound recording--, see D. E. 
Biederman, E. P. Pierson, M. E. Silfen, J. A. Glasser, R. P. Berry, "Law and Business of the 
Entertainment Industries" 2nd ed. PRAEGER, NY, 1992, 383-512. 
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recording guarantees only statutory royalties150: once he authorizes the first 
fixation of her music in a phonorecord (again as treated by the 1976 Act), he 
accepts the resulting compulsory license. However, a composer who has at least 
some right in a new subject matter-the phonorecord--can be expected to be less 
150
• When the Court decided in White-Smith that piano rolls "constituted merely parts of 
devices for mechanically performing the music", the seeds of the composer's compulsory license 
were planted. 
The legal concept of such a license was introduced by the 1909 Copyright Act revision. 
"Because of what seemed at the time a well-grounded fear of monopolistic control of music for 
recording purposes, Congress qualified the right ·of mechanical control by providing in 
subsection ( e) of Section l that if the copyright proprietor himself used or sanctioned the use of 
his composition in this way, any other person was free to do so upon paying a royalty of two 
cents for each part (each roll or record) manufactured." Latman's Copyright at 206. 
The 1976 Copyright Act also provides a limitation in the case of recording nondramatic 
musical works for commercial purposes in § 115: "Scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic 
musical works: Compulsory license for marketing and distributing phonorecords." The 
compulsory license concerns any kind of mechanical reproduction, by record, cassette, or 
compact disc or any future material fixation. 
The royalty rate was, in the 1980s, five cents per composition per recording, or .95 cent 
per minute of playing time, whichever is greater. 37 C.F.R. @ 115(c) (1982). Although the 
Copyright Act of 1976 indicates that the royalty rate is "two and three-fourth cents, or one-half 
of one cent per minute of playing time of fraction thereof,• 17 U.S.C. @ 115(c) (2) (1982), this 
rate has been increased administratively several times under the authority of 17 U.S.C.@ 804 
(a)(2)(B) (1982). For details, see S. L. Bach, "Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory 
Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law". 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 379, 380, (1986). See alsQ, 
Henn, "The Compulsory License Provisions of the United States Copyright Law" (1956), 
reprinted in 2 Studies on Copyright--Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition 877 (1963); Blaisdell, 
"Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License in the Copyright Law" (1958), reprinted id., 
937. 
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likely to disturb commerce within a rapidly evolving music industry151 • (Or, 
differently expressed, and perhaps more methaphisically, the composer's royalty 
was granted anticipating a far more lucrative market in the sound 
recording152.) 
This expansion of copyright subject matter--even if accompanied by a less 
expansive right in it by the original authorial composer--represented the creation 
151
• •congress adopted this compromise position between White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. 
Apollo Co, 209 U.S. 1, 28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655 (1908) and full copyrightability", Miller 
and Davis wrote, as an ameliorative device against totally control of production by the composer 
and the domination of the market by the company which at that time effectively monopolized 
the recording market. Intellectual Property, at 314. 
152
• Usually, commentators and courts ( e.g., Sony Corporation of America v. City 
Studios) assume that the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology, that the invention of a new form of copying equipment gave rise to a new need for 
copyright protection. For example, the development and marketing of player pianos and 
perforated rolls of music determined the creation of the new exclusive right over the production 
of such copies, and White-Smith preceded the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909. 
Supposing this to be true, why do the new statutory rights, instead of benefiting the genuine 
author, created entirely new copyright owners, and/or instead of going to individual creators, 
are in fact overextended to companies and other non-creative commercial enterprises? 
It is very important for the purpose of this paper to realize that a recorded performance--
a sound recording-- is better protected than the original music. While anybody can perform and 
record previously recorded music, upon payment of statutory fees, without any fear that a 
recognizable product constitutes infringement of the music, a re-recording of an original album 
will constitute infringement of the copyright owner's right in the first sound recording as long 
as "the final product [is] 'recognizable' as the same performance as recorded in the original." 
United States v. Taxe, 380 F.Supp.1015, 184 U.S.P.Q. 7(C.D. Cal. 1974) aff'd, 540 F.2d 
961, 192 U.S.P.Q. 204 (9th Cir.1976). That is slavish performance of a composition that is 
already recorded is free for the taking-compulsory licenses being paid--but a slavish recording 
of an existing sound recording (the product of entrepreneurial and technological resources, and 
not artistic creativity) is forbidden. 
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of a new monopoly for the benefit of a new class of copyright holders: the 
music-businessmen, which has encouraged the music industry in general, but not 
necessarily the individual author153 , who usually works for a more limited 
remuneration. What this legislation accomplished was to grant a very powerful 
153
• At the risk of being redundant, I repeat that the vast majority of creators are corporate 
employees. 
What before 1909 wasn't even addressed by U.S. copyright statutes-the employed 
"author"-, with the 1909 Act became a "controversial innovation", coming a few years after 
the initial judicial "doctrine of works made for hire", and with the 1976 Act the exception 
changed into the rule. 
Jaszi considered this fact (Toward a Theory of Copyright at 487), as a departure from 
copyright ideology. I would disagree with him because copyright regulation has never been truly 
a protection of "Romantic authorship," but, basically, a commercial regulation. If the copyright 
monopoly has been accepted to protect almost any kind of non-functional expression, why is an 
emotional defense- the necessity for a "creative incentive"-, advanced to protect the naked 
entrepreneurial .interest, when the employed· author is treated as any other employee. (Related 
with this background I would like to advance the idea that the author is generally regarded as 
an •intellectual worker. • I find this astonishing and close to inexplicable, explained only by the 
inherent conflict these entrepreneurs face: proud members of a free market economy, they exist 
only through massive government intervention!) 
I have not discussed here the conditions of copyrightability, but in the case of a sound 
recording it is interesting to see that originality may proceed from the performer's unique 
contribution or the producer's technical employees, or both. Neither party has a copyright 
interest under American law. Another perspective which emphasizes the producer's and 
performer's authorship, on the copyrightable elements of sound recording, appears in H.R.REP. 
NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. COD~ CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
5659, 5669; also H. REP. NO. 487, 92D Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1566, 1570. 
I still wonder why a performance which is not copyrightable, recorded, has as a result 
copyright subject matter--the sound recording. The only reasonable answer is that copyright is 
commercial protection which was corrupted by the false argumentation of "authorial protection 
and incentives for creation" and, which in the last instance is justified only by the public interest 
in dissemination of information. 
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commercial monopoly--in particular sound recordings-, more extraordinary than 
any other legal protection ordinarily enjoyed by ,a class of mere entrepreneurs. 
(An incentive designed to motivate art has no justification here any more than 
for a Texas farmer's motivation to raise cattle, for example: Both 'investors' 
seek to procure an identical benefit, or rent in economic terms. The most 
, 
obvious and perhaps only difference between musical art and agriculture from 
the point of view of the ordinary entrepreneur is that after aircraft, American 
musical and other entertainment art is the most heavily and successfully 
exported. 154) 
Assuming that commerce in music demands a special monopoly, different 
from agricultural subsidies, for instance, at least "the evil ought not to last a day 
longer than is necessary" for its purposes155, and not simply as long as appear 
politically possible to secure the music-businessmen the most outrageously 
154
• See Rockwell, The New Colossus. 
155
• However, commentators cannot help complaining about the inequitable treatment suffered 
by sound recording companies as copyright holders. "The Copyright Act affords less protection 
to sound recordings ( ... ) than to written musical works and other kinds of copyright works. 
Musical score copyright owners have the exclusive right to perform and reproduce their work. 
Sound recordings copyright owners hold no corresponding right of exclusive performance. 
Similarly, sound recording copyright holders' exclusive right of reproduction is narrower than 
the corresponding right granted to musical score copyright holders." L. Benjamin, "Tuning Up 
the Copyright Act: Substantial Similarity and Sound Recording Protection", 73 Minn. L. Rev. 
1175' 1175 (1989). . 
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profitable return on their investment156• But, of course, that is not the case and 
these entrepreneurs receive a benefit only justifiable if they were, in fact 
authors, supplying on more example to interpret the copyright statute, not as a 
securing authors' rights, but as a pure commercial reglementation157• 
b) THE MUSIC PERFORMING RIGHT AND ITS 
EXPLOITATION 
In the process of promoting and endorsing desirable copyright regulation, 
the American music industry succeeded not only in subverting the individual 
copyright owner, but it also has alienated another copyright right from the 
156
• Ironically, almost every American commentator sympathizes with the copyright owners 
of sound recordings in comparison with other owners. They do not seem to understand that even 
if, as merchants, producers have some claim to their status they have no moral claim to such a 
powerful monopoly to the natural rights of individual author. 
157
• The reason for the 1972 statutory revision was the fact that "rival manufacturers would 
simply obtain masters or copies of the authorized producer's phonorecords and proceed to 
reproduce and sell pirated copies( ... ) paying nothing to anyone.• Miller and Davis added that 
"recognizing this untenable situation, Congress finally granted record companies a copyright in 
their phonorecords in 1972 and empowered them to bring infringement actions against pirates." 
Intellectual Property, at 315. 
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composer-the performing right158• While the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording does not possess a statutory right of performance159, the composer 
is only theoretically more privileged. 
The performance right in a musical composition, "the most important of 
the performance rights," 160 long described as problematic due to private 
158
• Section l(e) of the 1909 Copyright Act gave the owner of the copyright of a musical 
composition the exclusive right to perform it publicly for profit. Under this provision there are 
three elements of a cause of action for infringement of the "performing rights" by or in 
connection with motion pictures, radio, and television: there must be a "performance" of the 
copyrighted work, the performance must be "public,• and "for profit." 
As a result of the 1947 amendment of @ l(e) of the Copypght Act the owner of a 
copyright for music has the exclusive right to make any arrangement or setting of the 
composition or melody for the purpose of public performance for profit and also for the purpose 
of printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending the copyrighted composition. But this 
provision did not give the copyright owner the exclusive right to make an arrangement of the 
music for the purpose of making a record. 23 A.L.R. 2d 244, *2. 
159
• Under§ 106 (1)(2)(3) and (4) the owner of the copyright has no performing right in his 
sound recording. 
§114. Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings, in 1976 Act. Latrnan, Copyright for 
the Nineties. Statutory Appendix, at 27. 
For a doctrinal analyses, Meyers, "Sound Recordings and the New Copyright Act" 22 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 573 (1977); Lang, "Performing and the Right of the Performing Artist", 
21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 69 (1974); Nimmer, Cases and Materials on Copyright 
206-39; H. G. Henn, "Henn on Copyright Law. A Practitioner's Guide", (3d ed), 1991, p. 205. 
160
• Nimmer, Cases and Materials on Copyright, at 237. 
For a new approach to performance rights (which have been in existence since the 1897 
amendment to the Copyright Act), as a distinct form of neo-copyright--the performance 
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enforcement and policing difficulties161 , does not actually belong any more to 
the composer, but to abstract entities, such as the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP. 162 (ASCAP has always been 
presented as an immanently contemporary and modem way to protect 
copyrighted compositions.) 
When copyright collectivization began, the movement was considered by 
commentators as well as its initiators as progressive and exclusively in the 
interest of authors, designed to maximize their commercial benefit. The 
copyrighted musical work has often appeared not economically feasible for 
copyright-- defined as "a private copyright use tax,• see Paterson, Copyright Overextended, 393-
4. 
161
• "Musical works, however, by their very nature may be performed on such an extensive 
basis as to render it impossible for individual composers and publishers to enforce effectively 
their performance rights on an individual basis. " id. 
162
• In order to take full advantage of the new statutory right, the performing right, "a group 
of prominent popular composers-among them Victor Herbert and John Philip Sousa-• formed 
the "first performing rights organization in the United States. The purpose of the organization 
was to serve as clearinghouse for performing-rights licensing (thereby reducing the cost of 
individual licensing) and an agency to monitor performances and police infringements. With the 
aid of their able and dedicated ~ttomey, Nathan Bur.kan, ASCAP embarked on a litigation 
campaign to establish their rights." Latman, Copyright for the Nineties, at 521. 
On ASCAP' s purpose and history, see International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 
F. 2d 375, 376 n.I (7th Cir. 1988). 
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copyright holders "to monitor and obtain payment for each such use. "163 
Composers, as.copyright owners, were convinced that collective societies would 
overcome this difficulty. By providing centralized administration, more 
transactions would occur at lower costs164 .and by pricing jointly, collective 
action would lead to potential market power. 
Therefore, together with judicial cooperation, they considered it requisite 
for composers to form umbrella associations and pool their resources in order 
to effectively guard against unauthorized use of their compositions.165 Their 
societies166 have succeeded to exercise so "aggressively" their performance 
163
• S. M. Besen, S. N. Kirby, S. C. Salop, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Collectives," 78 Va. L. Rev. 383, 383, (1992) [hereinafter, An Economic Analysis]. 
164
• On the rationale for an institutionalized and bureaucratic collective administration versus 
a personalized administration of owners rights see, An Economic Analysis, p. 384: "Collective 
administration of the copyrights of a group of owners increases production efficiency when its 
cost is lower than that of administrating the copyrights of all possible subsets of the same group 
of owners." ( I use these authors' opinions taking into account their recognition that there is a 
conflict between their analysis and the fact that these are instances in which it is relatively easy 
for users to obtain licenses directly from authors. However, except for the· situation of movie 
producers, virtually all other music users license the performing right through ASCAP.) 
165
• This stereotype rationale is common place in many cases. See, for instance Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, (W .D. 
Ok. 1982) 546 F. Sopp. 1276; 1982-2 Tnlde Cas. (CCH) P64, 943, 943 (1982). 
166
• Nimmer calls them "performing rights societies", in An Economic Analysis, they are 
called "copyright collectives," and G. W. G. Kamell, "collecting societies" in "Collecting 
Societies in Music", Collecting Societies in the Music Business ( D. Peeperkom, C. van Rij, 
D. Lester, L. Faulder, eds), MAKLU Publishers, Apeldoom/Netherlands--Antwerpen/Belgium, 
1989, 15-21. 
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right that, apparently, it might not even be subject to the doctrine of fair use 
(which is supposed to be available "regardless of the type of work 
involved"167). 
When ASCAP was created perhaps both, music publishers and composers 
imagined that they had truly collective interests, perhaps a fraternal sense168, 
and that they could equally control their exploitation. After only a few decades, 
however, ASCAP was subjected to the terms of a series of consent decrees 
which provide that its members have no individual economic powers upon 
acceptance of member-status in ASCAP169: 
1. Its role as an intermediary between members and user is in fact fluid: 
when it is a question of a direct loss, such loss falls upon its members, because 
167
• Paterson, Copyright Overextended at 39. 
168
• In Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, 180 F. Supp. 322, 325; 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
P69,543; 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the 33 composers-plaintiffs alleged that 
the other major American collective society, Broadcast Music, Inc.,(BMI) is "wholly owned 
by radio and television broadcasting companies. BMI is engaged primarily in the acquisition and 
licensing of performance rights in musical compositions." 
169
• About ASCAP's acquisition of performance rights in musical compositions that have 
been synchronized with motion pictures, see United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) P62, 595, at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Another consequence of ASCAP's membership 
is that its members must grant such rights to motion picture producers simultaneously with 
synchronization rights., i.e., the rights to record the music in the sound track. See, Alden-
Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) 
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ASCAP is only an agent, "the middle-man between the songwriter and the 
user" --effectively a collection agency, or "co-operative society." 170 When it is 
a question of recovery of damages, the Second Circuit has stated that such funds 
"would go to the society," and the "plaintiffs were necessary parties merely 
because they hold their respective causes of action in trust for the society. "1711 
2. Sometimes, ASCAP's conduct has a negative impact on its members 
interests. For instance, in a recent infringement case involving ASCAP's 
members' performance rights, the defense was that "plaintiffs are estopped from 
claiming infringement because ASCAP allegedly violated a consent decree 
issued by the Southern District of New York in United States v. American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and.Publishers. "1'.2 
170
• See Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, where a loss is supported by ASCAP's members 
rather than by the agent itself. 
.. 
171
• See, e.g., Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1936). There are many 
cases where the vindication of the right of public performance of members' songs was brought 
in the name of ASCAP, e.g. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Reality Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Jewell-
LaSalle Reality Co. v. Buck, 283 U.S. 202 (1931). 
172
• Trade Reg. Rep.(CCH) P 62.595 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 1950). The district court refused 
to address the estoppel argument or to add ASCAP as a party in the case, concluding that any 
dispute between defendant-infringer and ASCAP should be brought as a separate suit. Bourne 
Co., Henry Mancini, d/b/a Northridge Music Co., SBK Robbins Catalog, Inc., v. Hunter 
Country Club, Inc., 990 F.2d 934; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P27,079; 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
P70,179; 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 546 (7th. Cir. 1993). The court's attitude in rejecting 
the defendant's claim against ASCAP in this case confirms once more that ASCAP's and its 
members' interests diverge, and maybe, even conflict. One is left to wonder ASCAP real 
an eco-esc pendulum of copyright 
--------------------------------
72 
3. ASCAP's members agree to an "impersonal"173 determination of the 
terms of the licenses and the rates to be charged. "Individual members do not 
pass upon, approve, ratify or object to license terms agreed to by the 
Board. "174 ASCAP determines the work's license fee and the rate its member 
will share from the total fund, and ASCAP has the final decision subject to 
judicial review in cases of disagreement between it and its members.175 
4. Even though for over fifty years, now, ASCAP was required to allow 
its members to have some economic power to negotiate outside ASCAP, many 
members, like the thirty three composers-plaintiffs in Schwartz, have not 
granted a single license since they became ASCAP members, although they 
possess this theoretical equal right to grant non-exclusive licenses. 176 The 
interest is if not that of its members! 
173
• ASCAP's Board of Directors decides these problems. Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 330. 
174. id. 
175
• In United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) petitioner Karmen--ajingle writer-, raised the issue of federal over state court 
jurisdiction in a matter concerning the value weighted by the ASCAP's Board of Directors for 
jingles. The court ruled for defendant. 
176
• Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 332: "While the 1941 decree voided the exclusive 
licensing right in AS CAP, the fact is ( ... ) that no plaintiff granted nondramatic public 
performance licenses." Plaintiffs in their interrogatories categorically stated: "The license for 
nondramatic performance for profit for all compositions ... have, since 1940, been issued by 
ASCAP." 
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Board of Directors controls and disposes of all funds received, and determines 
the net amount to be distributed among the members. ASCAP members under 
the Articles of Association by which they are bound177 have executed 
agreements which unequivocally transfer to ASCAP a nonexclusive right to 
license public performances for profit of their compositions. In practice then, it 
is from ASCAP alone, which negotiates the licenses' fees, that fellow members 
receive royalties in an amount ,determined and controlled by ASCAP178• 
ASCAP is hardly a fraternal organization, but a big business and courts have 
noted that "even were it accepted that ASCAP is a 'cooperative society' which 
renders services exclusively in the interests of its members, this would 'not 
remove its activities from the sphere of business179." 180 
5. What makes the composer's status even more puzzling is that even if 
ASCAP members resigned, while it would terminate all existing assignments, 
the resignation would be subject to certain rights or obligations existing between 
177




• American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943). 
180
• Schwartz, 180 F. Supp. 322, 331. 
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ASCAP and its licensees. Specifically ASC~ would continue to have the right 
to grant nonexclusive licenses in a resigned writer's composition as long as his 
publishers and collaborators remained members of ASCAP. 181 One must 
wonder: If a maximization of profit results due to the existence of such 
collective societies, whose interest is protected besides the collectives own 
interest as a separate entity?182 . 
6. It seems that the composer's status in this situation, is similar to that of 
18th century English authors, who were tolerated in order to justify for 
publishers benefits of the book-business. First of all, they seem to have no. 
chance to exploit their copyright monopoly as outsiders from collective societies. 
Secondly, inside the collective societies, as members, they have a disadvantaged 
status in comparison with ASCAP' s music-businessmen members--the music 
publishers: 
On one side, the net royalty amount, which ASCAP designates for its 





• Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Taylor, 10 Misc:2d 9, 55 N. Y.S.2d 94 (S.Ct.N. Y. 1945). 
182
• It is clear, at least that the interest in question is a commercial one. 
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Board of Directors. 183 On the other side, the large majority of publishing 
contracts are concluded in fact with ASCAP publisher houses184• Thus, 
ASCAP' s composers depend economically upon their publishers, their assignees. 
In theory this position obliges ASCAP's publishing houses to exploit ¢.eir co-
members' works in good faith for their mutual benefit185, because everything 
depends on this exploitation. In reality, as plaintiffs in Schwartz v. BMI 
proved186, "some publishers, who were ASCAP houses, organized BMI 
companies and although in theory functioning separately, in fact, because of 
special concessions granted by BMI to the publishers, refrained from promoting 
non-BMI music or curtailed its exploitation. "187 
183
• The amount to be distributed is divided into two equal parts: one for allocation among 
publisher members and the other for allocation among writer members. Articles of Association 
of ASCAP, Article XV. 
184
• In Schwartz the plaintiffs had entered into agreements with 300 music publishers who 
were also ASCAP members. The agreements covered approximately 5,800 of the 7,000 
compositions written by plaintiffs. 
185
• Broadcast Music v. Taylor, see supra note no. 180. 
186
• Plaintiffs identified a number of firms engaged in this practice. 
187
• In Schwartz plaintiffs charged that music publishers with whom they had contracts were 
induced by subsidies, restrictive covenants, incentive payments and other devices including 
payments of salaries of publishers' employees, to refrain from publishing and exploiting 
plaintiffs' songs, and that "these activities were all for the purpose" of discrimination in favor 
of BMI songs. They also alleged that concessions were granted by BMI. Schwartz, 180 F. 
Supp. 322, 335. 
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Assuming that composers cannot efficiently protect their performance 
rights, this is certainly relevant for the establishment of ASCAP, but only or at 
least mostly with respect to the unique situation in which composers' copyright 
interests are the issue. Nevertheless, whether it is ASCAP, Bl.\fi188 or other 
similar so-called non-profit organizations, one can hardly say that they routinely 
or even often act for the benefit of their members' individual interests. 189 
188 The public performing rights to most copyrighted musical works are licensed by two 
major performing rights societies ASCAP and BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) See, Nimmer on 
Copyright, §8.19; S. Shemel, & M. Krasilovsky, "This Business of Music" (rev. ed. 1977), at 
163. 
While ASCAP boasts a repertory of over 3 million compositions, BMI gloats over a 
million of them. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); J. M. Fujitani, "Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: an 
Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation" 72 Calif. L. Rev. 103, (1984). 
On behalf "of its more than 50,000 members [in United States of America v. American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (S.D.N.Y. 1993), this number is given as 
40,000], ASCAP licenses thousands of radio and television stations, restaurants, nightclubs, 
concert halls, and other establishments whose owners desire to perform copyrighted musical 
compositions." Pedrosillo Music v. Radio Musical Inc. and Thomas Carrasquillo, 815 
F.Supp. 511; 27 U.S.P.Q. 2D (BNA) 1153 (D.P.R. 1993). 
BMI, a nonprofit corporation owned by members of the broadcasting industry--CBS was 
among the broadcasters who formed BMI-- was organized in 1939, and affiliated in 1979 some 
10,000 publishing companies and 20,000 authors and composers, operating in the same manner 
as ASCAP. 
189
• Under fiduciary law, ASCAP and any other collective society, must act on behalf of its 
members. One might say that an elite and a riffraff are reduced to a common denominator. In 
this act of membership, hardly a matter of free choice where the collective acts for everybody, 
it appears very progressive per se, but is very perverse in fact. It masks an oppressive burden 
upon the individual creator, who has to sustain not only his business partners, her publishers, 
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Depriving their members of performance rights, and exercising them 
autonomously through nonexclusive licenses of those rights, collective societies 
emerge as the reification of the relationship between the-individual composer and 
his abstract intermediary. This reification has as a result the substitution, for 
human uniqueness, of a bureaucratic mechanism which pretends to represent the 
best interests of the author. 
In fact, however this reification is deceptive and false for it would be 
accurate only if the members of collective societies had been only individual 
composers. But collective societies operating in the music industry190 join 
composers, pu~lishing houses, members of broadcasting industries, individuals 
but also his benefactor, the collective society. 
"The manner in which performing rights societies operate is a most complex and 
voluminous subject raising problems primarily of an antitrust rather than copyright nature." 
Nimmer on Copyright, §8.19. It is astonishing, but not unusual, for the legal technician like 
Nimmer to avoid this problem 'by such a definitional leap, for collective societies are nothing 
if not purely, entirely, and only, a creature of the copyright regime which framed and sustained 
them. Also Sobel, "The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the 'Economic 
Realities' of Blanket Licensing," 3 Loyala Ent. L. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); Timberg, "The·Antitrust 
Aspects of Merchandising Modem Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, • 19 J. Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 294, 298 (1954). 
190
• Almost every domestic copyrighted composition is in the repertory either of ASCAP, 
with a total, in 1979, of three million compositions, or of BMI, with one million. 
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and corporations191 , indeed almost anybody meaningfully involved in the 
commerce of music. 
While the Copyright Clause, represents government intervention in this 
commercial area, the collective societies represent a private bureaucratic 
intervention, under the rubric of the author's interests. However, ASCAP and 
other similar organizations are the primary beneficiaries of this interventionism. 
On one hand, the users have an all-or-nothing choice192 in choosing to accept 
the collective's fee schedule, and on the other hand, its members are in the same 
191
• One might say, in other words, that the act of joining intellectual workers and their 
exploiters together is another example of how capitalism goes on its triumphant march. 
192
• ASCAP through its licensing department grants performance licenses to users of music. 
They are of two kinds: (1) a blanket license, which is the type generally issued; and (2) a 
program license. The terms of the licenses and the rates to be charged are decided by ASCAP's 
Board of Directors. Individual members do not pass upon, approve, ratify or reject terms agreed 
to by the Board. 
All royalties and license fees collected by ASCAP are pooled in a common fund. 
Controls over and disposition of all funds received is vested in the Board of Directors. The funds 
are first disbursed to meet operating expenses and payments owed to affiliated foreign societies. 
Upon payment of the foregoing plus reserves which may be established, the net amount 
remaining is distributed among the members upon order of the Board of Directors. The amount 
to be distributed is divided into two equal parts: one for allocation among publisher members 
and the other for allocation among writers members. See, for details, Articles of Association of 
ASCAP, Article XIV and XV. 
For a recent clise see, e.g. United States of America v. American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ. 13-95 (WCC), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7058. May 
1993, S.D.N. Y. 
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situation are having no choice concerning their remuneration and other interests. 
While its members retain the right to individually license public performance, 
even if ASCAP grants a nonexclusive license, a member has almost never 
competed with it. Created as a common agent193 to minimalize the license's 
cost, by its own existence, ASCAP discourages users from licenses with 
individual members194 • 
The remarkable success and effective monopolies enjoyed by performing 
collective societies makes it more obvious as nothing else that copyright was and 
remains a commercial regulation of a failed free market. This bald assertion 
receives considerable support from the case law involving the relations between 
collective societies and their users. 
193
• On ASCAP as agent, see, e.g. Knight Kitchen Music, v. John J. Pineau, Civ. No. 
92-0169-B, 149 Bankr. 239; Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P75,097; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) I"l.7, 052; 
23 Banlcr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1427. 
The 2d circuit Court of Appeal, however, has recognized that ASCAP is not a mere 
agency nor a single conduit for its members, Buck v. Ehn Lodge. 
194
• A recent suit against ASCAP and BMI, decided in October 1992, at the district court 
level, contesting their dominant position in the music market, is International Show Car 
Association v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, and Broadcast 
Music, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1308; 1992 U.S. Dist. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70, 056. 
(E.D.Mic. 1992) 
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In Broadcast Music195 one of the three national commercial television 
networks-CBS™-sued the two major collective societies in the music 
industry on the ground that the blanket license system constituted illegal prices 
under antitrust law.197 CBS was, of course, the world's largest manufacturer 
and seller of records and tapes1.98 and also a leading music publisher, with 
publishing subsidiaries affiliated both ASCAP199 and BMI. Justice White held, 
in his majority opinion200, contrary to CBS' claim, that the blanket license is 
195
• Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. l; 99 S. Ct. 1551 
(1979). See also, P. Areeda, "Antitrust Analysis. Problems, Text, Cases" Little Brown, Boston, 
Toronto (3d. ed. 456-66), 4th ed. 232-242. 
196
• It supplies programs to approximately 200 affiliated stations telecasting approximately 
7,500 network programs per year. 
197
• However, CBS would have preferred that ASCAP make all its compositions available 
at standard per-use rates within negotiated categories of use. If the first were illegal, CBS urged 
that ASCAP be forbidden to issue any blanket license or to negotiate any fee except on behalf 
of an individual member for the use of his own copyrighted work or works. Broadcast Music, 
441 U.S.l, 17; 99 S.Ct. 1551, 1561. 
198
• "The giant of the world in the use of music rights", and the "No. l outlet in the history 
of entertainment," quoting a CBS witness, Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, 4; 99 S.Ct. 1551, 
1554. 
199
• On the evolving relationship between CBS and ASCAP, see also United States of 
America v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, (S.D.N. Y. 1993). 
For more details about litigations involving ASCAP, see "Copyright in Free and 
Competitive Markets" (W. R. Comish, ed.), ESC Publishing, Oxford, 1986, 92-6. 
200
• Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion thought that such a request was entirely 
proper and that "the blanket all-or-nothing license is patently discriminatory". "The user 
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"not a species of price fixing categorically forbidden by the Sherman Act," an 
unreasonable restraint of trade201 • 
purchases full access to ASCAP's entire repertoire, even though his needs could be satisfied by 
a far more limited selection.• In the end Justice Stevens observed that "the ASCAP system 
requires users to buy more music than they want af a price which, while not beyond their ability 
to pay and perhaps not even beyond what is 'reasonable' for the access they are getting, may 
well be far higher than they would choose to spend for music in a competitive system." 
"The all-or-nothing bargain allows the monopolist to reap the benefits of perfect price 
discrimination without confronting the problems posed by dealing with different buyers on 
different terms." Cirace, "CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Problem" 47 
Ford. L. Rev.277, 286 (1978) 
Under the ASCAP consent decree, on receipt of an application, ASCAP is required to 
"advise the applicant in writing of the fee which it deems reasonable for the license requested." 
If the parties are unable to agree on the fee within 60 days of the application, the applicant may 
apply for a judicial determination of a "reasonable fee." United States v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 
Trade Cases para. 62, 595, p. 63,754 (SDNY 1950). The BMI decree contains no similar 
provision for judicial review. 
201
• The Department of Justice first investigated allegations of anti-competitive conduct by 
ASCAP in the 30s and 40s. See, Cohen "Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act", 29 
Geo. L. J. 407, 424 n. 91 (1941). A criminal complaint was filed in 1934, but the Government 
was granted a midtrial continuance and never returned to the courtroom. In separate complaints 
in 1941, the United States charged the blanket license, which was then the only license offered 
by ASCAP and BMI, was an illegal restraint of trade and that arbitrary prices were being 
charged as the result of an illegal copyright pool. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. no. 13-95 
(SDNY 1941), pp.3-4. The case was settled by a consent decree that imposed tight restrictions 
on ASCAP's operations. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cases para. 56, 104 
(S.D.N. Y. 1941). Following complaints relating to the television industry, successful private 
litigation against AS CAP by movie theaters ( Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 
(S.D.N. Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jenson, 80 Supp. 843 (Minn. 1948), appeal 
dismissed sub nom.; M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F. 2d 515 (CAB 
1949)), and a Government challenge to ASCAP's arrangements with similar foreign 
organizations, the 1941 decree was reopened and extensively amended in 1950. United States 
v. ASCAP, 1950-1951 Trade Cases para. 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
The 1950 decree, as amended from time to time, continues in effect, and the blanket 
license continues to be the primary instrument through which ASCAP conducts its business 
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This opinion shows that competition law and ·copyright law are 
complementary, and represents an exquisite demonstration of the idea that 
copyright is a commercial regulation. First, Justice White touted the economic 
benefits of ASCAP's blanket license, and minimizing the coercion involved, 
citing similar coercions present in both compulsory and secondary transmission 
cable requirements.202 Secondly, if it is true that the economic exploitation of 
performing rights attains its zenith through a bureaucratic agency203, this can 
under the decree. The courts have twice held the decree does not require ASCAP not to issue 
licenses for selected portions of its repertory. United States v. ASCAP (Application of 
Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.), 208 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N. Y. 1962), aff'd, 331F.2d117 
(CA2), cert. denied,, 377 U.S. 997 (1964); United States v. ASCAP (Application of National 
Broadcasting Co.), 1971 Trade Cases para. 73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also, United States 
v. ASCAP (Motion of Metromeda, Inc.), 341 F.2d 1003 (CAZ 1965). 
202
• Some examples of this kind of coercion are the compulsory license for secondary 
transmission by cable television systems, 17 U.S.C. App. §111 (d)(S)(A), and the license for 
the use of copyrighted compositions in jukeboxes, which is usually payable to the performing 
rights societies such as ASCAP, id., §118(b). 
203
• It is often explained that the interest in collective societies belongs not only to composers 
who elsewhere are unable to control all uses of their compositions, but also to users who instead 
of having to make a separate contract for each use with each composer, conclude just one 
contract with ASCAP for all its 3,000,000 compositions. As is well known, the blanket license' 
'price' is composed of the price of individual compositions plus the administrative costs. 
Theoretically, ASCAP' s interest, independent of those of its members or of non-member users, 
can be calculated. 
["Users of music" in the current Articles of the Society are any person, firm, or 
corporation who or which: 1. owns or operates an establishment or enterprise where copyrighted 
musical compositions are performed publicly for profit, or 2. is otherwise directly engaged in 
giving public performance of copyrighted musical compositions for profit. See W. B. Emery, 
"Broadcasting and Government: Responsibilities and Regulations" Michigan State UP, 1971, 
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certainly only be possible because of the structure of ·copyright law, vesting 
commercial privileges which can be optimally used only in a certain way.204 
373.] 
Accepting the arguments of efficiency-assuming them to be true-are the courts ready 
to embrace, as a solution of all difficult <;ircumstances, bureaucratic mechanisms, which then 
primarily, and in the first place, are destined to serve their own interests? [About the role of 
bureaucratic agencies in the American society see, Emery, Broadcasting and Government; M. 
A, Franklin, & D, A. Anderson, "Mass.Media Law" 4th ed. 1990, 762-3; M. Seidenfeld, "A 
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic state" 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1519-20 
(1992)] 
204
• The development and growth of organizations involved in monitoring reproduction of 
works, using new technologies which rapidly facilite the reproduction of all forms of intellectual 
property has made the maturation of collective administration of copyright a reality. It is 
motivated by the apparent necessity to counterattack the widespread and decentralized 
phenomenon of reproduction, assisting individual owners in enforcing their copyrights. 
Nevertheless, if copyright is a monopoly legitimii:ed by the public iiiterest in intellectual 
production, and as a logical extension of this assumption collective administration is a necessity, 
the issue is how strong this monopoly has to be, and, accordingly the administrative bodies as 
well. In copyrighted works, production involves both authors and entrepreneurs, but it is the 
latter who have the dominant position among the copyright holders. 
In other words, the public interest actually vindicated in this field is the businessmen's 
commercial not author's creative interest. With this in mind, the strength of the copyright 
monopoly gains little legitimacy from its present level: around 75-100 years, covering almost 
any tangible express'ed 'thought'. First, because among businessmen, those involved in 
intellectual production are obviously uniquely protected by monopoly power, secondly because 
among those involved in copyright, a member of an administrative collective society gains 
administratively a dominant commercial position, and thirdly, an individual author has no real 
ability to penetrate the copyright business without a private or collective "agent", Conseq1,1ently, 
the present status of the copyright monopoly as actually administrated seems no more amenable 
to more rational solutions than to square the circle. 
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C. COLLECTNE PROTECTION OF EUROPEAN 
MUSIC 
In Europe205 , the collective copyright administration-including music-, 
is basically the same as the American practice206• If collecting societies were 
205
• Europe, for pUipOses of this paper, means EEC, or that Europe, presented suggestively 
by P. Y. Gautier, as "a matron who is in good health, has twelve children, so far, and endeavors 
to secure the prosperity of all her family." "The 'Single Market' for Works of Art" 144 
R.I.D.A. 12, 12 (1990) 
On the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty establishing the European Community (EEC), see e.g, N. 
Green, "The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market" Oxford; New York: Oxford 
UP, 1991. 
206
• Apparently everything is quite similar: The majority of authors' societies are societies 
concerned with private rights although the Italian society, SocietA Italiana degli Autori ed Editori 
(SIAE) is a society concerned with public rights. Not only is SIAE subject to continuous 
supervision by the Presiding Commitee of the Italian Society of Ministers, but its articles of 
association must be confirmed by a Presidential decree. 
Even if the majority of societies are involved with private rights, they are watched over, 
in one way or another by public authorities, ranging from governmental appointment of a 
number of the administrators (in the Nordic countries) or of an official (the Netherlands 
performing rights organization, Het Bureau voor Muziek-Auteursrecht--BUMA--is subject to 
permanent supervision by the Minister of Justice), to the obligation to account for its 
administration to a protective body (in the Republic of Germany), or directly to the Secretary 
of State (in France). Except for Luxembourg, which has no collecting societies of its own, in 
each EEC member state the licensing of music performance rights abroad is orchestrated by a 
single organization. See A. Dietz, "Copyright Law in the European Community" 212-37 (1978). 
On the United Kingdom, where apparently there are two powerful.collective societies, 
see, Whale on Copyright 134-5; Fujitani, Controlling the Market, 129-31. 
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originally established to handle the right to perform alive music to 
audiences207, when recordings came about, they quickly expanded their 
function with the aim of administering the right to mechanical reproduction and 
distribution of musical recordings. From authors' rights, collective 
administration spread to other rights, such as performers' rights, the rights of 
audio and audiovisual producers', and broadcasters rights, as well as expanding 
their focus from the national to the international level208 • 
Unlike the American system, most European countries make a distinction 
between the author's right to royalties and the protection of producer's rights. 
As the materialization of authorship, the author's copyright is vested only in the 
individual author. The sound recording producer is endowed with so-called 
. The first performing rights society, Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique 
(SACEM) was formed in 1851, in France. See H. C. Jehoram, "Basic Principles of Copyright 
Organizations" 26 Copyright 214, 215 (1990). 
On the French domestic basic regulation of collective societies, see Bertrand, Le droit 
d'auteur, 740-2. 
208
• There is a specialized private international organization for musical performing rights, 
which establishes an international system of reciprocity between collecting societies all over the 
world, the Confederation Internationale des Societes des Auteurs et Compositeurs-CISAC. For 
details, Karnell, op. cit. 18-21. ASCAP itself has, as well, agreements with 41 foreign 
organizations. B. Korman, I. F. Koenigsberg, "Performing Rights in Music and Performing 
Rights Societies" 33 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 332, 353-54 (1986). 
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neighboring rights209 • (This difference, however is often neglected, and it is 
not uncommon that authors and producers become members of the same society. 
However, in this paper.I will discuss only the relationship between composers, 
performing rights societies and EEC law210.) 
209
• This term of art is an abbreviation of "rights neighboring to copyright." It was first used 
in 1948 at the Brussels Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention. In this 
way, for first time, a wish to protect three other interests was expressed-those of performers, 
phonogram producers, and broadcasters--independently from the author's rights~ Finally it led 
to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations, the Rome Convention of October 10/28, 1961. See, Porter, Beyond 
the Berne Convention, 20-1; H. Cohen Jehoram, "The Relationship between Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights" 144 R.l.D.A. 81, (1990) [hereinafter Cohen, Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights]. 
In Europe, the European Commulli.ties have embarked on a whole range of proposals 
aimed at improving neighboring rights protection, primarily for performers and phonogram 
producers. These measures might be considered as a first step, not to protect carriers of 
information at the same level as the authors, but "to replace authors by industry." Cohen, 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, at 123. 
These propositions started with the Green Paper on Copyright of the Commission of the 
European Communities [Com (88) 172 final, Brussels, 7 June 1988), and include in particular 
a recommendation from a Council decision concerning accession <lf all Member States to the 
Rome Convention by December 1992. See, W. Rumphorst, "Neighboring Rights Protection of 
Broadcasting Organizations" 10 EIPR 339 [1992). 
210
• For the purpose of this paper, EEC law includes Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty 
which deal with the free movement of goods-and especialy Article 36 which allows, as the 
permissible grounds for restrictions· on imports, "the protection of industrial and commercial 
property"--, Article 59 in respect of the free movement of services, and Articles 85-6 which 
prohibit certain agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common 
Market and may affect trade between Member States. See, H. E. Pearson, and C. G. Miller, 
"Commercial Exploitation of Intellectual Property" Blackstone Press ltd., 1990, 235-47 
[hereinafter Pearson, Commercial Exploitation]; E. McKnight, "Copyright and a Single Market 
in Broadcasting" 10 EIPR 343, 344 [1992]. 
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As is often noticed, the author who becomes a· member of a copyright 
society relinquishes to a great extent his "proprietary right." Since the society 
has as its declared objective to maximize its repertoire revenue, it cannot be 
choosy in licensing. "The composer who wants to have his symphony performed 
by the Wiener but not by the Berliner Philharmoniker" -du Bois, the legal head 
of the Dutch BUMA once remarked-"should not become a member .of a 
copyright society". And yet, as an outsider, a composer has no meaningful 
chance to exploit his work. 
The European collecting societies claim legitimacy for their activity on two 
grounds: (1) Authors' rights, perhaps owing their genesis to more 
philosophically aesthetic arguments, as well as neighboring rights, have actually 
A prestigious European collective legal work "left aside the case law concerning the 
application of Article 86 to authors' right societies", for the reason that "does not concern the 
specific character of copyright.• See Copyright in Free and Competitive Markets. I politely 
disagree. 
However, I use in this section "reproduction" according to the French definition, 
consisting of physical copying of the work by any process which enables it to be communicated 
directly or indirectly to the public. It is characterized by the creation of physical sound media, 
such as the manufacture of a record. "Performance,• in the same terminology, consists in "the 
direct communication of the work to the public.• It may be done by performers before the public 
or by means of physical recordings of the work. See id., at 21. 
Also, not be discussed here, is the case law of the Court of Justice in consideration with 
the European Free Trade Association (EFf A) and the copyright market. 
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become effective economic rights to remuneration. (2) As economic rights, there 
is only one way. to handle them efficiently, which is collectively. This analysis 
also explains the single-minded determination of these societies to seek profits 
so aggressively because the membership whose sole interest is defined as 
pecuniary depends on income received from the society. 
However, after collection the revenues have to be distributed, apparently 
not a simple matter. After deduction of costs--including the societies' 
considerable expanses-and assigning a portion of revenue for social and cultural 
purposes-, the rest belongs to authors on the basic principle that the money 
should be paid to the authors whose works have been played or performed 
during the time for which the money is collected. Here occurs the problem, 
common to all collective societies, the problem of gathering program 
information. It appears this intractable problem cannot be solved, only 
compromised. Consequently, each society applies its own system of distribution, 
using its criteria and inevitable imperfections. 
From the beginning of his career the composer knows that he has virtually 
no chance to exploit his composition on his own. Accordingly, he accepts the 
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proce&s of fees distribution211 , as well as the possibility. of an eventual open 
conflict with his society. To the contrary, collective societies share no such 
reluctarice or ambivalence and enjoy and cultivate their composer-members 
support, because- they are their apparent source of income. 
Thus, the relations between the European (and U.S.) collective societies 
and their members are structured on the dominant position of the first, who in 
tum logically feel free to promote their own interests even at the risk of damage 
to its members. For example, before the 1970s, the German collective society 
insisted on an all-or-nothing assignment: A member had to choose between 
assigning all his present and future rights to GEMA or, lose his membership 
status. 
The Commission of the European Community212 has intervened directly 
in the structure and management of these societies in countries within the EEC. 
A detailed account of the functioning of thesw collecting societies, the 
211
• On blanket license system and fees distribution, see also P. Goldstein, "Commentary on 
'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives'" 78 Va. L. Rev. 413, (1992). 
212
• The Commission of the European Communities, based in Brussels, has the primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of EEC competition law, Articles 85-6 of the Treaty. The 
Commission is the equivalent of the EEC civil service, which derives most of its power from 
orders of. the Council of Ministers, representing the governments of the Member States. 
Decisions of the Commission can be reviewed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), based 
in Luxembourg. Pej\rson, Commercial Exploitation 242-3. 
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Commission and the European Court provided in two major decisions, in Re 
GEMA213, which involved the German society214, and in Belgische Radio 
en Televisie v SABAM.215(no.2)216• Those decisions made clear that 
whatever practices a collective s~iety uses, they may not be abusive. It was 
emphasized that an abuse may arise either "from the terms of the constitution of 
a collecting society, or from its internal decisions, or from its transactions with 
members or outsiders; and that a practice may be abusive in its unfairness either 
to members or potential members or to users of the works. "217 Thus, even if 
213
• (no.1)[1971]C.M.L.R. D35 OJL 134/15, and (no.2)[1972]C.M.L.R. DUS. 
214 Gesellshaft fiir musikalische Auffiihrungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfiiltigungsrechte/Gennossenschaft zer Verwertung Musikalischer Auffiihrungsrechte. 
215
• SABAM is the Belgian Association of Authors, Composers and Publishers. It is a 
cooperative association whose object is to exploit, administer, and manage all copyrights and 
kindred rights, for its members and associates and for its clients and affiliated undertakings. 
Almost all authors resident in Belgium seek the help of SABAM in collecting their royalties. 
In BRT v. SABAM (1974 E. Comm. CT. J. REP. 51, 2 COMM. MKT. L.R. 238) the 
Commission pointed that copyright collective societies are undertakings within the meaning of 
Articl~ 86: By acting as agencies which safeguard the rights of musical composers, they perform 
the function of an undertaking engaged in the provision of services. Furthermore, because these 
societies have a quasi-monopoly in the field of authors' rights in their respective countries, they 
are deemed to have a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market. For more 
details, see F. L. Fine, "The Impact of EEC Competition Law on the Music Industry" 12 J. Intl. 
L. Bus. 508, 519-20 (1992) [hereinafter Fine, The Impact of EEC]. 
216
• Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 313. 
217
• Stone, Copyright Law, at 126 
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noticed only in passing, that a collective society will act in its own interest, 
ignoring its charge to protect its members' interests, is significant enough to 
merit discussion in EEC case law. 
Re GEMA (No. 1) represents the most detailed examination of the internal 
regulations of a collecting society primarily from the viewpoint of EEC 
competition rules. The Commission issued that GEMA had abused its dominant 
position (a) by discriminating against nationals of other Member States218 and 
(b) by binding its members to excessive obligations. The Commission said that 
"the abuse also lies in the fact that GEMA binds its members by obligations 
which are not objectively justified." These were: (i) the restriction on members 
freedom to divide rights, its members being required to assign their rights for 
all categories and regions; (ii) The unfairly complicated rules governing the 
transfer of membership to other societies, including assignment of future works 
and long waiting periods; (iii) the absence of judicial recourse of members over 
internal procedures and rights; and (iv) the denial of ordinary status for members 
218
• That society refused to conclude contracts with others if they are established in Member 
States other than Germany. 
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who are economically dependent on, or employed by, a user of musical 
works219. 
It was also held in Re GEMA (No. 1) that, "insofar as membership 
depends on income received from the society, credit must be given for similar 
income from similar societies established in other Member States; that a society 
must not confer economic benefits on some members at the expense of others 
without reasonable justification," and "that it is an abuse for a collecting society 
to attempt to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts to review the society's 
decisions at the request of its members. "220 
In addition to this problem of discrimination regarding membership or 
members' rights, the Commission also condemned excessive requirements 
related to assignments. Thus, both GEMA decisions established that a collecting 
society must not insist on receiving an assignment from its members of rights 
for countries in which the society does not carry out direct administration of its 
rights, but authorizes a foreign societ)' to act as its agent. 
The issue of abusive internal relationships between the collective society 
219
• However, in 1981, the Commission permitted GEMA to amend its rules to protect its 
members against pressures from financially powerful music users. 
220
• Stone, Copyright Law, at 127. 
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and its members, addressed in the 1970's was extended in the 1980s to the 
international arena concerning abusive representations of each collective society 
of a Member State by the analogous collective society in another State. In 1989, 
The European Court, in a case involving the French collective society for 
musical works-SACEM-, ruled in a very delicate issue concerning reciprocal 
representation agreements between collective societies in connection with Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty221• 
The Court ruled also in regard to the abuse of a dominant position, 
contrary to Article 86, through the demand for excessive royalties (the 
continental performing societies practice, as do their American counterparts, the 
221
• Minist&e Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, decided 13 July 1989, Stone, Copyright 
Law at 212. Normally, SACEM is involved in cases of unfair trading conditions under both 
Articles 85 and 86-which means dominant positions in their relationship with music •users,• 
which is not this paper's topic. (Usually, discotheque operators claim that SACEM's tariffs are 
higher than those applied by the authors' societies in the other member states, and oppose its 
lump sum clause found in SACEM standard contracts concluded with these operators. The lump 
sum clause requires, as does the ASCAP blanket license, one payment for its entire repertoire. 
The irony of this situation is that only seldom do European discotheques play other than 
American music.) 
About the two similar rulings of 13th July in the Court of Justice, concerning SACEM 
and the discotheque operators, see Fran!;()n, A. "The Conflict between SACEM and 
Discotheques before the Court of Justice of the European Communities• 144 R.I.D.A. 50 
(1990). 
an eco-esc pendulum of copyright 
94 
blanket license system222). The significance of these reciprocal representations 
between admittedly dominant national collective societies for the purpose of this 
discussion is that it becomes impossible for an outsider composer to penetrate 
the business. There is no choice in order to exploit his composition, otherwise 
than by accepting a membership within a collective society. The corollary of this 
is that the collective societies exercise complex control over the copyright music 
market.223 
222
• With respect to this practice and its effects, a very suggestive case was decided by the 
Italian Constitutional Court, (decision no. 241 of the 3rd of May, 1990). It found constitutional 
article 180 of the Italian Copyright Act, under articles 3, 23 and 41 of the Italian Constitution, 
reversing a lower court decision. (Under art. 180-3, of the Italian Copyright Law/ L. 22 April 
1941--Protezione del diritto d'autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio--the Italian 
collective society, la Societa italiana degli au tori ed editori (S.I._t\.E.), is the sole Italian licensor 
of copyright. In these circumstances it is not difficult to imagine that there are no negociations, 
just that imposed by this organization. 
Article 3 della Constituzione Italiana provides equal treatment among partners to 
negotiations, and article 41 regulates any public activity--which might be considered S.I.A.E' s 
activity and social goal. With respect to article 23, about fiscal attribution, the users claimed that 
the S.I.A.E. actually fixed taxes for the use of any copyrighted work of its repertoire. See the 
Italian Constitution and Copyright Act in E. B. Benucci, and M. Fabiani "Codice della proprieta 
industriale e del diritto d'autore" AG--Milano, 1982) · 
This decision is important not because it doesn't consider that the lack of equal treatment 
by S.I.A.E., is sufficient proof of on unconstitutionality. It is suggestive because the 
Constitutional Court doesn't seem interested in the danger of monopolizing potentionally 
important information by a bureaucratic organism, by ignoring important social needs. 146 
R.I.D.A. 257 (1990). 
223 Towards the end of 1960 and in the 1980s the Commission examined the rules 
of the societies and the agreements for reciprocal representation in the light of Articles 85 and 
86 of the Treaty of Rome. Articles 85 and 86 are known as the. EEC competition rules. Article 
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In the early 80s the Court of Justice also had the opportunity to interpret 
Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty224 with respect to the activity of music 
collective societies. GEMA unsuccessfully sued225 , under German Copyright 
Law, the importers of recorded music legally manufactured in another Member 
State--with the consent of the owner of the cQPyright in the works concerned'"-, 
for a charge of l. 75 per cent of the retail price. GEMA demanded from the 
85(1) prohibits agreements and concerted practices which have the ooject or effect of restricting 
competition within the Common Market, subject to the possibility of an exemption (individual 
or in block) on public policy grounds pursuant to Article 85(3). In qrper to qualify for an 
exemption under Article 85(3), an agreement must satisfy two "positive" and two "negative" 
criteria. The "positive" criteria are that the agreement must either contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. The 
"negative" criteria are that the agreement must not impose restrictions which are not 
"indispensable" nor which may eliminate competition with respect to' a "substantial part" of the 
products or services in question. 
Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market or a 
substantial part of it. In contrast to Article 85, however, Article 86 does not provide any 
possible exemption from a finding of abuse. 
These Treaty provisions are supplemented by the Manager" Control Regulation--MCR--, 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 19889 and which went into effect on 
September 21, 1990. (33 O .. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L257) 14 (1990). See also Fine, The Impact 
of EEC, 508. 
224 
•. The French Government had contended that Article 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty was 
not applicable owing to the specifics of copyright arising from moral rights. Cornish ( ed), 
Copyright in a Free Market, at 29. 
225
• Musik-Vertrleb Membran v. GEMA, Judgment of the Court of justice of 20 January 
1981, in Joined Cases 55 and 57/80, [1981] ECR 147. 
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importers the difference between the royalties paid in the United Kingdom--the 
country of first marketing--and the royalties which it would have received if the 
records had been first marketed in Germany (8 per cent of the retail price). 
This is another clear example of the reification of the relationship between 
the membership and the collective society, when the copyright owner's interest 
becomes undeniable distinct, even opposed, to that of the collective 
administration's interest226: Even if the individual owner assigned or licensed 
his performing right to a manufacturer, from another Member State, which has 
no contractual relations with GEMA, after considering that this is in her best 
interest, GEMA attempted to prevent this. There is no individual composer, 
even hypothetically, whose interest is being served, there is just very clearly the 
separate and divergent interest of GEMA in its repertoire and its decision to 
226
• Another attempt of the same type also belongs to GEMA when in 1984 it announced its 
intention to charge German copyright royalties on all custom pressings performed in West 
Germany, even where the record company had obtained a mechanical license from the 
mechanical copyright society of another Member State. The Commission found GEMA's 
practice would have infringed Article 85. In the Commission's view, a license granted by the 
copyright collecting society of a Member State is valid throughout the Community and authorizes 
the manufacture of sound recordings, even by means of custom pressings, in any Member State. 
See Fine, The Impact of EEC, 514. 
As is quite obvious, the Commission sees its interest as regulating the business 
relationship, to give as equal a chance of bargaining as possible equal chances of bargain to 
sound recording manufacturers, conclusively assuming that composers, for example, are already 
protected by their mere status as members in collective societies. 
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maximize its institutional interest.227 
This has been often noticed if not routinely deplored by European 
scholars. Concerning the( French practice, for example, if copyright is regarded 
as a proprietary rather than aesthetic right, scholars have characterized the result 
as a nationalization of the composers' rights by the use of equitable shared 
royalties among owners228 • Thus, the price for membership is the alienation 
of the author's rights as the price of a remuneration, which is' based more on 
purely economic criteria, than on other factors even though continental 
authorship rights are based on theories that reject an economic fundament.229 
m. It would be good to remember that Europe is the continent which provides author's 
moral rights. Then, what of the author's unassignable moral right to decide which environment 
is the best for the cultural and economical exploitation of his own work? 
228
• In original: • expropriation en matiere musicale: la remuneration equitable". p. y. 
Gautier, "Propriete litteraire et artistique," Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1991, 135-8. 
The author seems more concerned about the situation of neighboring rights than that of author's 
rights owner. 
229
• This may be a good opportunity to emphasize that in both systems, Copyright and 
Authorship, the rights are vested in the author or owner of the intellectual work-other than 
industrial--by the fact of a legal relationship with that work. That neither authorship nor any 
intellectual relationship caused by the mere fact of creation generates the copyright/author's 
right. Contrary, the intellectual work, defined by each domestic statute, as any piece of real 
property, generates to any of its "possessors" special monopoly rights. By "possessor" I mean 
the person or corporation with the right of control over the work, drawing the means of its 
future exploitation. 
The only perceptible difference between the Copyright domestic statutes and the 
Authorship statutes is their underlying philosophy: In Copyright system the intellectual work--
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It may dampen competition among composers members, but in any case it 
proves that the so-called economic incentives implied by copyright/author's 
rights theories have no more role here than it had at the beginning of its history. 
Working for the collective societies, effectively as mere employees, composers 
will create more or less following their own capacities and predilections, and not 
by the effective salary they receive "working for a collective society. "230 The 
incentive theory is not dead, it was never more than a myth. 
* 
In the U.S. or in Europe, the music business is structured in the same 
way: The composers are the workers, normally, and their "agent" is the true 
other than that with industrial functionality-- has value due to its potential commercial 
exploitation; while in the Authorship system, the same kind of work has legal importance due 
to its capacity of imposing a national culture and identity. 
These maybe subtle observations are more and more touchable in the present international 
environment dominated by new strategies of world colonization. 
230
• While ASCAP worldwide (non:.ciomestic) receipts were $358 million in 1990, the British 
Performing Right Society collected approximately $220 million, and the French SACEM total 
revenues for the same year were about $431 million. Besen, at 385. 






beneficiary. Assuming that this is the only way to run the music business, and 
the only way to assure composers a share in the benefit of their music, what is 
the justification for the long copyright monopoly? 
What about the theory of reward for authorial efforts? What about 
economic and "moral" incentives? How does one justify a commercial monopoly 
in an age of free trade and free markets? 
In this context, what about the ultimate basis of copyright statutes (in U .K. 
and in the U .S.A), to support and promote learning and mass education? Has 
that been just language, or, if it had a real meaning is it now outdated? Or if 
true as national domestic policy might it not reflect international realities? Some 
of these issues are addressed in the third part of this paper. 
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BOOK ID. RESURRECTION 
Because the ideology of copyright is so deep-seated the reader may be 
tempted to fabricate new theories to save it from the argument so far presented 
that copyright is just a private commercial regulation. But a close examination 
of the earliest and still most important international treaty should serve us as 
antidote to this temptation. 
A. THE BERNE CONVENTION 
The Berne Convention represents not only the climax of 19th century 
universalism, but the framework within which (what were then the 
representatives of) the dominant players in the international community have 
been promoting and securing their intellectual property interests. The first Berne 
Conference took place in 1883, and "set the business like tone for the whole 
operation. "231 This tone is colored by a Romantic (Victor) Hugo-ian vision of 
231
• Saunders, Authorship, at 175. 
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cultural politics232• Even if this vision is different from the purely industrial 
and commercial vision underlying the U.S. refusal- of joining the Treaty233, 
both visions ultimately influenced Berne protections. 234 
232
• In the last half of the 19th century, national creations became particularly valued as "an 
exportable product and a source of culttlrill legitimacy." See Saunders, Authorship, at 171. 
With France seeking its place as the Humanity of the world, as Victor Hugo it expressed 
in the Guide to the 1867 Universelle Exposition (P. Greenhalgh, "Ephemeral Vistas. A History 
of the Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World Fairs" Manchester UP, 
Manchester, 1988, at 16) the twelve countries present at the 1886 Conference- Switzerland, 
Germany, France, the UK, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Tunisia, Liberia, Haiti, and the USA and 
Japan as observers--, realized that the Berne Convention had important justification preserving 
their identities within an evolving cultural trade, and if possible encouraging its export. 
233
• The United States refusal is consistent with its prior approach to Copyright. The 
copyright industry was too important to allow a "single" person to control a work's exploitation 
for all countries. (S. Ricketson, "The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works: 1886-1986" Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College and 
Kluwer, London, 1987 at 56.) 
Even if that individual was not in fact the author, but his publisher, or his agent, that is 
a commercial party, Copyright did not implicate a free market where competitors would have 
had unlimited powers. The decision to publish a work was supported not only by economic, but 
by political reasons, whether or not cultural, educational or informational logic reinforced it. 
On the other hand, the American domestic market was still sufficient to satisfy the industry. The 
United States would change it attitude toward the Berne Convention not when the external 
market become dominant, but when the domestic market no longer relied upon cultural imports. 
In other words, when piracy ceased to be a national policy, because the domestic market had 
sufficiently developed--in fact became internationally dominant! 
Thus, the international extension of American copyright becomes justifiable because 
practically it works no harmful impact domestically upon a rich American society where the 
"tax" for the work's use is affordable and is an ideal way of maximizing the external market. 
234
• It is very important to note that originally, the Berne Convention did not mention 
"moral rights", which always were considered the bridge between the Common-law copyright 
and the Civil law author's right. The international protection of copyrighted works actually 
an eco-esc pendulum of copyright 
i 
102 
Almost from the beginning, the idea of a r~al universal framework of 
uniform regulation was rejected, and instead, the national treatment principle 
was adopted. Under that, each member country, appreciating best its own 
interests, will adopt the domestic statute which sued it best, and will impose it 
not only upon to its own citizens but upon any foreign author seeking protection. 
This policy of national treatment is adjusted by a minimum level of protection 
ensured by the treaty's terms. The work of the Berne Convention continues 
within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the umbrella 
organization which oversees the operation of this treaty and the other main 
multilateral conventions. It persists in giving a general impression of an 
institutional effort to respond universally to everybody's particular needs.235 
lacked any Romantic basis behavior. What was Romantic was the national desire to accede 
through culture to a dominant world position. 
However, the 'moral right' was embraced by the Convention at the 1928 Rome 
Revision. Before the 1928 Conference, there was no mention of this right. "Only when the 
Conference began did the Italian delegation propose that the right of attribution, the right of 
integrity and the right of disclosure be adopted as part of the Convention." (Saunders, 
Authorship, at 182. E. See Piola-Caselli, "Codice del diritto di autore. Commentario della nuova 
legge 22 aprile 1941--XIX, n. 633" UTET, Turin, 1943.) 
In this context, I confess I suspect the international community of a philanthropic, good 
deed after all. Who proposed this "right"? The representatives of a country in which the author 
has no economic power, all license contracts being made by S.I.A.E .. 
235
• For an overview of the connections between the main international copyright 
organizations, see Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention, 69-100. 
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B. THE COPYRIGHT BATTLE .OF THE TWO ROSES: 
THE USA AND THE EEC 
In many ways the concern of copyright policy is to confer monopoly 
protection on intellectual goods which cannot be patented236, such as 
technologies in computer programs, semiconductors, and electronic transmission 
of signals and data. Regarding computer programs, "most industrial countries 
have moved to provide standard copyright protection since programs are 
236
• On the international protection of intellectual property, it is generally accepted, that the 
Berne, Rome and other conventions, negotiated through a series of international conferences, 
allow individual states the freedom to consider the advantages and disadvantages of joining a 
particular convention, and of deciding how best to take advantage of each of them. On the other 
hand there are supranational treaties, such as NAFrA and EEC. They establish not just 
alternative procedural arrangements, to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)-
which administers the Bene Convention-, but substantial means to protect and promote their 
members interests. 
What is revealing is that today, copyright protection inside the EEC uses the same 
method to escape harmonization, as it did in 1789 to escape abolition: Even if today it claims 
that its philosophy is the "natural author's right" in his work, which legitimiz.es as long a term 
as possible, Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome exempted it from the common market in goods 
and services, on the same old reason that it is included in the system of property ownership of 
the Member States. Porter, Beyond the Bene Convention, at 26. 
A comparison of WIPO's and EEC's efficiency would yield one of the reasons for the 
Stockholm conference: The Berne Convention was accepted to protect literary and artistic works 
against new technological developments, but did not reconcile the demands and needs of the 
First and the Third World. See, Porter, Beyond the Berne Convention, 9-10. 






expressed in a literary medium and do not have direct industrial utility. "237 
With respect to semiconductors, industrial countries, including the European 
Community, have recognized the need for a unique protective mechanism for 
chip topographies. In this case, because they are not "easy" copyrightable, the 
companies involved in such a technology· resigned themselves to a 10 year 
monopoly (subject to limited exceptions). 
Within the area of electronic signal transmission, the problem of payment 
involves not only the copyright owner's earnings, but also another, more subtle 
and interesting issue of economic, political and cultural interests. Nevertheless, 
this second echelon problem of payment is doubly important. First, it shows that 
237
• "The European Community as a World Partner", 52 European Economy, 1, 175 (1993) 
[hereinafter The European Community]. 
Within the EEC there is now legislation specifically providing for copyright protection 
of computer programs in France (by an Act of 3 july 1985), in Germany (by an Act of 24 June 
1985), in Spain (by an Act of 11 November 1987), as well as in the united Kingdom (under the 
1988 Act, which replaces a similar provision contained in the Copyright (Computer Software) 
Amendment Act of 1985. Moreover the EC Commission, in its recent Green paper on 
Copyright and the Challenge of Technology- Copyright Issues requiring Immediate Attention ( 
Ch. 5, ·pp. 170-204 of the Green Paper deals specifically with computer programs), envisaged 
the adoption of a directive under Article lOOA of the EEC Treaty, designed to harmonize the 
laws of the Member States in relation to the protection of computer programs within copyright. 
In January 1989 the Commission filed with the Council a proposal for such a directive. See 
[1989] O.J.E.C. C9/13, [1989) 2 C.M.L.R., Stone, Copyright Law, 14, 178. 
Even so, there are claims that copyright provides insufficient protection for software; that 
copyright may be easily circumvented by imitators who need only to rewrite the code sufficiently 
to convince the courts that the imitating program did not result from "slavish copying." 









actually there is no individual copyright author, and thus no or far less reason 
for copyright to be considered an economic incentive for any author. The 
payment is made to corporate entities: (i) the program's producer which owns 
the copyright and (ii) its broadcaster which owns the neighboring right. Second, 
both payment solutions advanced by the EEC and the USA necessarily imply a 
bureaucratic system: The European Community attempts to establish a 
harmonized policy in its member countries that would transfer greater payments 
to broadcasters, through collective societies. The US compromise provides that 
broadcasters get limited copyright protection plus remuneration from cable 
operators at a price set by government! 
An interesting though collateral issue involving the transmission of 
electronic signals is related to the incestuous economic interests of both 
producers of broadcasting equipment and of broadcasting systems. States' 
political and cultural considerations merge and complicate the picture238• 
When the Japanese proposed a unique image-production of 1125 lines and 
238
• The cultural concern for broadcasting "real European programs" /"programmes europeens 
proprement dits" evolved on a large scale with the use of the two TV satellites--Astra lA and 
Astra lB. P. Werner, "Une fa~n de faire de la television Europeenne" 355 Revue du Marche 
Cummun et de l'Union Europeenne 168, 169 (1992). 





60 Hz it acquired considerable influence because of the already wide spread 
MUSE system of distribution239• The European Community immediately had 
its broadcasting equipment and broadcasting system industries create the rival 
EUREKA system. The European EUREKA system of signal-distribution, and 
the TVHDffiFTV (Television a Haute Definition/HiFi Television)240 are 
central issues within the European Community cultural environment. Even more 
239
• This is the French abbreviated denomination of the Japanese system. Y. Guinet, "Sur 
la genese du program Europren de TVHD EUREKA 95," 127, 127, id. 
240
• "L'arrivre de la TVHD constitue un enjeu mondial ~ complex qui touche autant 
l'industrie eJ.ectronique que l'industrie des programmes et !es teJ.espectateurs, et trois 
protagonistes rivalisent dans la bataille intemationales des normes: le Japon, !'Europe et !es Etats 
Unis. "IHFTV constitutes a very complex world~de issue which affects not only the electronic 
industry, producers and consumers, but also involves a rivalry between the interests for world 
supremacy: between Japan, Europe and the United States. (Europe in this context means Western 
Europe, and its TV systems are PAL and SECAM, and the American system is NTSC. In this 
context that which first developed the most advanced broadcasting system is Japan, with MUSE). 
J. M. Cruzate, "L'Europe et la Communaute: fondu-enchaine vers la television haute definition 
" id. 101, 101 [hereinafter, Cruzate, L'Europe]. 
Broadcasting represents for the European Community an opportunity to unify Europe. 
But their problem is not only how to establish a common political goal of creating an internal 
market, in the "agricultural style" -broadcast formats, for example, "would be prescribed, as 
there are standards for chickens' eggs"- but the Member States wish to preserve their hope that 
European harmoni7ation, on one hand "will go along with a recognition of national standards 
and features," and on the other hand, they will be able to "defend" themselves "against 
American predominance." The defensive strategy includes show business also. For details about 
this interference between the economic, cultural and political aspects of broadcasting, see 
"European Co-production in Film and Television. !Id Munich Symposium on Film and Media 
Law" J.Becker/M. Rehbinder, (eds), 1-5, 1989. 




since the Maastricht Treaty241 , they are determined to ensure a Western 
European hegemony242 marshalling blatent commercial regulation, 
protec?onism, and copyright doctrine to achieve that goal. As discussed here, 
the line between those techniques is illusory. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FACES 
HYDRA 
An objective understanding of international copyright243 is useful. 
Without it, there is the danger of being manipulated by efforts to legitimize on 
the basis fabricant public benefits through private rights acting as incentives for 
241
• See, X. Fels, "Presentation", id. 99, 99. 
Even before Maastricht, HiFiTV constituted one of the EEC's priorities, especially in 
December 1988, and in 1989 when its legal ·content was articulated in The Directive 
89/337/CEE. Cruzate, L'Europe, 105. 
242. It is beyoµd doubt that the EEC is dominated by its competition with its overseas partner. 
A recent article compared NAFl'A and EEC law, emphasizing their common politics concerning 
industrial property, including copyright. The author also noticed that it was in the context of the 
Uruguay Round, that NAFl'A first established important rights in intellectual property./"C'est 
a partir des travaux realises dans le eadre de la Ronde Uruguay que 1' ALENA a etabli pour la 
premiere fois d'importants droits et obligations en matiere de propriete intellectualle." J.-Y. 
Grenon, "L' Accord de libre echange nord-americain compare a la Communaute economique 
europeenne" 367 Revue du Marche Commun et de l'Union Europeenne 306, 313. 
243
• See supra note no. 1. 
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creativity one of the most powerful commercial monopolies in the world. And 
because the copyright mystique is commonly presented in very different terms 
to developed nations than to less developed ones the following respond to the 
arguments addressed to the former. 
Unlike users in the developing countries--the developed ones have a long 
tradition acknowledging that literary and artistic works provide social, cultural 
and economic benefits that each society wishes to secure for their population. 
These works involve significant economic costs, including training, time, 
materials, and technology acquisition. To cover these costs and to reward 
creativity, allowing ultimately the dissemination of ideas, only the copyright 
system, 244 it is argued, is suitable. 245 
However, a large part of the costs246 are due to the corporations 
244
• See supra note no. 1. 
245
• On the property rights system, the reward system and the use of contracts in establishing 
the property rights value in information, see Shaven, "Economic Analysis of Law," item #11, 
Chapter 8. Property Rights in Information, Class Notes, Harvard Law School, Fall 1993. The 
author pleas for property rights in information which value of use might be fairly established by 
contracts. 
246
• For one of the major analyses of the effect of copyright inefficiencies in the cost of the 
product, see Breyer, The Uneasy Case. 
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expenses, as long as they own the copyright247 • As long as the author is an 
employee248, their argument that reducing the returns of creativity will result 
from uncompensated infringement, is a false or at least, deceptive one. On one 
hand the retail price of copying machines in Europe includes a percentage 
dedicated for copyright and other related rights owners249 • And on the other 
hand, in developing countries, relatively free access to copyrighted works has 
to be endorsed for the sake of human rights, such as the right to access to 
information250• 
247
• See J. F. Hornick, "Computer Program Copyrights: Look and Feel No Evil," Software 
L. J. vol. 5 355, (1992). 
248
• This is the status of the author today in developed countries, who is either an employee 
of companies producing software, and other technological products, or an employee in the 
entertainment industry, such as broadcasting. For a comparative presentation of the employer--
employee (author) relationship, in the United Kingdom and the United States, see N. J. Wilkof, 
"Continuity and Discontinuity in the Law of the Author as First Owner" 8 EIPR 288 (1991). 
For a general presentation of the author-employee under U.S law, see R. C. Dreyfuss, "The 
Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976" 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 590 (1987). 
About the distinction between the "natural author" and "the author-in-law", called also 
"the corporate author", see Patterson, Copyright Overextended, 390. 
249
• See, for example, the pricing of VCR and video tape in France. Those percentages are 
collected by specialized collective societies. 
250
• "Le droit d'acces aux informations, qui est plutOt garanti qu'assure, est place dans le 
contexte d 'un droit de J'homme, ce qui contraint a ne le limiter que dans des cas exceptionnels, 
mais non au territoire et aux citoyens de la Communaute. "I The right of access to information, 
which is merely recognized than secured, is defined ·as a human right. In this context, it can be 
limited only exceptionally, and never with regard to EEC citiz.ens. L. Kriimer, "La Directive 
90/313/CEE sur l'acces a !'information en matiere d'environment: genese et perpectives 
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At the legislative level, there is an urgency in the pleas for greater 
enforcement of copyright which should be understood in the context of a new 
era of truly international trade. Most of the interested companies-- intensive 
copyright owners-, are multinational, meaning net paid profit at many levels 
and regions. They earn both in the parent corporation country, in national 
currency, and, by establishing subsidiaries which produce copyrighted goods, 
foreign income, usually by license fees, with a keen interest in maximizing the 
foreign income251 • 
d'application" 353 Revue du Marche Commun et de !'Union Europeenne 866, 866 (1991). 
When the right to be informed is accepted, even if in a very narrowed way, as a human 
right, in the benefit of the citizens of developed nations, at least in the same way, due to its 
importance for human life, mutatis mutandis it should be so in the benefit of the developing 
countries. There, information might not be considered subject to anti-piracy legal measures, and 
a copyright owner infringement suit might be pre-emptied by the user's right to access to 
information. 
The subtle implications for human welfare in developing countries of restricting 
unauthorized copying have been broadly acknowledged. See, Johnson (1985), Novos and 
Waldman (1984) and Liebowitz (1985), all of them cited in The European Community, 175. 
251
• For example one international debate provoked by the large software companies in order 
to improve their competitive position invokes reverse engineering. While all companies, such 
as IBM, Ashton-Tate and Microsoft, based their production on it, they are those "who wish to 
outlaw reverse engineering" by other's practices. A. Johnson-Laird, "Reverse Engineering of 
Software: Separating Legal Mythology from Actual Technology" Software L. J. vol. 5. 331, 354 
(1992). 
See also the EEC position concerning software copyrightability, in A. Fakes, "The 
EEC's Directive on Software Protection and its Moral Rights Loophole," Software L. J. vol. 
5 531 (1992). 
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It is true, however, that the magnitude of royalties and fees paid depend 
on government policies, which are often subject to capricious external pressures 
demanding what the producer considers an "optimal pricing of information." 
While the international trade of copyrighted goods (as a part of the overall trade. 
in intellectual merchandise) the predominant tone is sounded given by the 
concerns of GA'IT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade252• 
GA'IT is the flip side of the attempt to control or at least regulate 
international efforts253 following the idea that "trade continues to serve a 
252
• See supra note no. 8. 
The Original U.S. proposals for an international trade organization "did not include more 
than passing reference to economic development." The U.S. position was that the "less-
developed countries could best develop by participating fully in a multilateral nondiscriminatory 
system with the lowest possible levels of tariffs and no quantitative restrictions." Dam, The 
GATT, 225. But after the 1955 Review Session, Article XVIII--the principal provision dealing 
with the problems of "less-developed" countries--emphasized that those countries "should be 
freer than developed countries to impose quantitative and other restrictions in order to proteCt 
infant industries and to combat payment imbalances." id, 227. (The text of this article, id., 418-
26) 
253
• The GA TI' negotiations, even if obscured at the last Round by the events in the Soviet 
Union and the Persian Gulf (and for many that represents the "fact" that crisis and war are the 
dominant factors in international relations, "while trade and economic relations are recessive 
elements"), are probably even more a significant because they represent a peaceful, potentially 
more successful bid to control the world. G. R. Winham, "The Evolution of International Trade 
Agreements," Toronto UP, 1992, 3 [hereinafter Winham, The Evolution of International Trade]. 
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communication function." GAIT is similarly pursuing copyrighted goods as 
just another element of the world commerce. For instance, the draft of Uruguay 
Round agreements254 promotes the underlying notion that domestic copyright 
statutes can be simply another form of government trade regulation255• The 
Uruguay Round presented, for the first time in GAIT's history, on its ideas 
protection agenda256 under "new issues"- Trade-related Intellectual Property 
(TR1Ps)257 • TRIPs has since been included in GAIT at the so-called 
"successful" conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 1993. 
About the real US expectations concerning GATT, see P. Behr, "Pre-Summit Trade Deal 
Seen Unlikely; Bentsen Views Accord on Tariffs as Elusive" The Washington Post, July 2, 
1993: "A successful GATT negotiations" would stimulate "an expansion of trade that could add 
$5 trillion to worldwide economic output in the next 10 years," Treasury estimates," and the US 
share would be $1 trillion. (The negotiations had failed for 6 years because of the endless debate 
between the EEC and the USA over farm subsidies.) 
254
• See "Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations," GATT doc. MTN,TNC/W/35 of 26 november 1990, which was updated in a 
document bearing the same title and tabled by the GATI' director-general on 20 December 1991. 
Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 71. 
255
• "The idea that over 400 pages of government-sponsored trade rules would be a move 
toward freer trade would have simply astounded Adam Smith," id. 
256
• See M. Jussawalla, "The Economics of Intellectual Property in a World without 
Frontiers. A Study of Computer Software" Greenwood Press, NY, 58 1992. 
m. This issue was the 13th from the originally 15 issues enumerated in the Punta del Este 
ministerial declaration. "The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiation," J. M. Finger, and A. Olechowski (eds.), World Bank, Washington, 1987, 
appendix 3. 






What is revealing about the complex function of copyright on the 
international level is the start and evolution.of TRIPs. First of all, it was the 
developed countries which started the debate. From their perspective inadequate 
protection of intellectual property was a serious non-tariff barrier to trade. They 
thus framed the issue as one of counterfeit goods. For their part, the developing 
countries put into question intellectual property rights (thus "copy-rights"), 
saying that "developed countries could use them to maintain a competitive edge 
relative to countries lacking sophisticated technological infrastructure. "258 
Boldly, and without apparent embarassement, what the United States 
proposed was to demand more from the developing countries, including them in 
a new international code of intellectual property259, opening their domestic 
258
• Winh!lfil, The Evolution of International Trade, 81. India and Brazil also viewed 
harmonical international protection of intellectual property as a barrier to trade. id. 
259
• Copyright, together with otJi,er intellectual property and technolpgy issues have not 
traditionally been seen as trade "(or even 'trade-related') issues." The United States and others 
think, however, that if they could be treated as a trade, rather than a copyright violation, 
intellectual pi:operty disputes could be resolved by "the enforcement of the GATT, rather than 
the apparently ineffectual one of local courts" or alternatively the traditional international 
agency, WIPO, could be used. S. Page, M. Davenport, and A. Hewitt, "The GATI Uruguay 
Round: Effects and Developing Countries," Overseas Development Institute, London, 1992, 47 
[hereinafter Page, The GATT]. 
See also "GATI or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property", (F. K. Beier, and G. Schricker, eds.), 1990; "Intellectual Property Rights: Global 
Consensus, Global Conflict?" (R. M. Gladbaw, T. J. Richards, eds.),1988; "Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (pts. 1 & 2), 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 223, 689, (1989), 
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market to American intellectual products260• At the same time they did not plan 
to change American copyright law, which indicates that at the international level 
the negotiations and copyright relations are one sided261 • This policy was 
imperiously assembled in one overall package which "all participants are 
expected to accept," changing the Uruguay Round approach from a bargained 
gradualist negotiation into an "all or nothing" edict.262 
Since the developed countries are the global supplier of technology and 
information and the developing countries are net importers, aside from GAIT, 
other unilateral actions (mostly bilateral treaties between the First and Third 
reprinted in "Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" (L. Brown, & E. Szweda, eds.), 
1990; P. E. Geller, "Can the GAIT Incorporate Bene Whole?" 4 World lntell. Prop. Rep. 193 
(1990). 
260
• The developing countries occupy a different economic position. The partly developed 
ones, such as Brazil and India, opposed including intellectual trade-related issues in the Round, 
because access the technology was very important to them and the trade interests relatively 
small. But yet, they are the most desired market, and it is expected that India will give way on 
pharmaceuticals, and the Brasilia to computers, without regard to the least developed countries. 
The latter are too small to matter for lost profits, but, nevertheless they have to support "all-or-
nothing" politics. 
And in all this, the textiles and agriculture are important enough for the South-Asian and 
Latin American countries, so that it is expected they too will accept strategy, thus imposing it 
upon all developing countries. Page, The Uruguay Round, 48-9. 
261
• The reaction of U.S. trade negotiators "can be summed up as follows: 'we didn'tgetinto 
the intellectual property negotiation to change our own laws' (comment from personal 
interview)." Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 93. 
262
• Winham, The Evolution of International Trade, 85-6. 
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World nations), described by some Western experts263 as a potential source of 
fragmenting or targeting the world trade264, have achieved much the same 
result, in the sense of . procuring desired legislative changes in developing 
countries265 • Their main trait seems to be a lack of commercial justification. 
While the US, Western Europe and Japan possess most of the world computer 
population266, the only effect of an international success at harmonizing 
263
• The authors of The European Community, 2d part, are: D. Greenaway, (University of 
Nottingham), P. A. Messerlin, (Institut d 'etudes politiques de Paris) and K. Maskus, (University 
of Colorado). 
264 What cultural exchange means for EC countries with Central and Eastern--including 
former Soviet Union- European partners is a very delicate issue. Sometimes it seems, that 
before all else, the EEC is concerned with "economic culture", that is with the creation of legal 
frameworks and market institutions which will ensure "equal opportunities for any company or 
individual to enter the market and to start business activity in a market economy." Y. Kuzminov, 
"Problems of Economics Culture Change" 49 European Economy, 217, 223 (1993). 
On an attempt to integrate the former "socialist" countries in research-programs, see E. 
G. Sanchez, "Cooperation scientifique et technique avec les pays de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est 
dans le cadre COST", 353, Revue du Marche Commun et de l'Union Europeenne, 877 (1991); 
E. Devoue, "L'Europe et la regionalisation des pays en voie de developpement: le cas de la 
cooperation regionale en recherche-developpement" 371 id., 718 (1993). On the poor results of 
technological and cultural cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe, when both partners 
know how vital this cooperation is for a decent future of the latter, see K. Szymkiewicz, "Le 
difficile 'retour a l'Europe' des pays de l'Est" 369 id., 527 (1993). 
265
• Legislative changes have been enacted since 1986 or are under consideration in Brazil, 
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, and Poland, among other 
countries. See the EEC rapport, The European Community. 
266
• The US controls about 90% of the computer sector of the international market and its 
manufacturers supply almost 100% of home market. IBM alone supplies about 65% of the US 
market. The major data banks are located in this same part of the world: Lockheed, which in 
1977 possessed 100 of the 500 publicly available data bases in the world, and SDC (System 
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national regimes into so-called "coherent international regulations" using as a 
model the domestic statutes of industrialized countries, will be to increase Third 
World dependence upon developed countries267. 
"Information is inseparable from its organization and 
form of storage. The knowledge will end up by 
modelling itself-as it always has done--on the stocks of 
information. The location of data banks constitutes an 
imperative of sovereignty. "268 
Development Corporation) which accounts for 75 % of the European market and 60% of the US 
market. J. Beck~, "Information Technology and a New Informational Order" Transnational Data 
Reporting Service--Studentlitteratur, Amsterdam, 1985, 57-60. 
267
• While these countries desire self-reliance and independence, and to protect themselves 
against further domination of their economic, social, cultural and political life, they also need 
to participate in the international exchange of views, knowledge, and commodities. 
In the context of digitaliz.ation of information, when TDF (transborder Data Flows) 
become the main source of information for news, education, scientific, and political decisions, 
this desire is unlikely to be achieved. Becker, Information Technology, 65, 67. 
At the same time the reader must remember, there are experts and others who really 
believe that the "economic embargo" (what is not economic?) was "the principal cause of the 
historic changes in the Soviet and communist world." And self- reliance in itself might not be 
desirable. D. E. McDaniel, "United States Technology Export Control. An Assessment" 
PRAEGER, Westport, 1993, 199. 
268
• S. Nora, "Report" in Advertising World, October, 1978, 20 cited in Becker, Information 
Technology, 67. S. Nora, and A. Mine, "L'Informatisation de la societe," La Documentation 
Fran~se, Paris, 1978, 72, cited in C. J. Hamelink, "Transnational Data Flows in the 
Information Age" Studentlitteratur, Amsterdam, 1984, 89. 




Certainly GAIT functions in part as just another tool to achieve global 
supremacy. The U.S.,in the Uruguay Round, simply initiated a policy also 
supported by firms in also the European Community and Japan engaged in 
significant product and technology innovations and artistic creation. Their desire 
for "strong and non-discriminatory minimum standards" for protecting 
' ' 
copyrighted products within GAIT is partially true. It might represent just a 
transparent mechanism, that is, one in which power relationships and not 
expressly drawn--for a world dominated by multinational firms. But these 
interests are not above national or at least regional interests. 
This truly irresistible force of the relationship between national copyright 
and its national subjects, and international copyright and dominated international 
trade makes somewhat ridiculous debate against extension of a commercial 
monopoly in the author's interest, both in time--duration of copyright-- and 
subject matter, as long as its basis of legitimacy--incentives for authors--is no 
longer true. If the ideology of authorship and incentives has been captured, as 
seems to be true, by institutional-national, international and multinational--
interests, which seem to profit so directly and naturally by that ideology, any 
hope or attempt to dismantle it at this point is probably naive. 
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